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ABSTRACT
In complex, rapidly evolving healthcare markets, vertical relationships play an
increasingly important role in pricing and health care delivery, creating or eliminating
barriers to market efficiency. Despite their importance, few studies have addressed
how vertical relationships affect care coordination and utilization and how public
policies affect the market through those relationships. This dissertation focuses on
two types of vertical relationships—the price negotiation between insurers and health
care providers and the relationship between health care organizations and physicians.
Chapter 1 examines the effect of medical loss ratio (MLR) regulation on insurer
pricing behavior in light of insurer-provider price negotiation. Such regulation could
disincentivize insurers from efficient cost-cutting, resulting in higher health service
prices and consumer welfare loss. Using a Nash-in-Nash bargaining model with a
regulation constraint, I find that MLR regulation rules out price bargaining equilibria
with low health service price. The empirical examination of the Affordable Care Act
MLR regulation shows that the regulation significantly increases medical cost for non-
compliant insurers. Either restricting health service prices or replacing the regulation
with a low-margin public option could keep prices low and improve consumer welfare.
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Chapter 2 utilizes patient changes of their primary care physicians (PCP) to exam-
ine the effect of health care organization boundaries on patient healthcare utilization.
We define a visit-based organizational care concentration metric to measure how pa-
tient health care utilization spreads across organizations. Applying that metric to
Medicare data, we capture the substantial variation of organizational care concen-
tration across physicians and regions. Leveraging on PCP changes due to the exit
of original PCPs, we find that patients who switched to PCPs with higher organi-
zational care concentration experience a significant decrease in their total healthcare
utilization without significant changes in quality of care.
Chapter 3 examines the consequences of vertical integration between hospitals and
physician practice groups, which could incentivize physicians to refer more patients to
hospitals and induce higher medical spending. Employing an event-study framework
and a discrete choice model, we find consistent and robust evidence that vertical
integration increases the probability of choosing hospital-based facilities for outpatient
surgical procedures, increasing both medical spending and travel distances.
vii
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Medical Loss Ratio Regulation and
Insurer Pricing
1.1 Introduction
Regulating a firm’s profitability is a common way for governments to try to obtain
efficient outcomes in critical markets. It is particularly important for the healthcare
market where private firms exploit their pricing leverage when complementing public
provisions (Einav, Finkelstein and Polyakova, 2018; Curto et al., 2019; Duggan, Starc
and Vabson, 2016). Unlike traditional rate-of-return regulation, which regulates the
ratio of profit to capital costs, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) limits the ratio of
a variable cost measurement (approximately) to revenue, which the ACA terms the
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR). The ACA MLR regulation requires each insurer in the
private insurance market to spend at least 80% or 85% of the premium revenue on
medical claims and quality improvement. The regulator’s goal is presumably to limit
insurer markups, hoping that this will improve the quality of insurance plans while
keeping plan premiums low. Between 2014 to 2018, 16 million individuals purchased
insurance plans in the individual private insurance market each year, accounting for
$74 billion of premium payment and $65 billion of medical claims spending (Cox,
Fehr and Levitt, 2019; Fehr, Cox and Levitt, 2019). Understanding the mechanism
by which regulation affects pricing and medical spending is critical for evaluating this
regulation and for designing future policies.
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It is far from obvious that higher MLRs translate into lower absolute markups for
insurance firms, better insurance plans, or more affordable health care services. Along
with the fact that the average MLR in the individual market jumped from 84.1%
in 2011 to 92.9% in 2016 (CCIIO, 2017), existing studies find that the ACA MLR
regulation is associated with improvements of insurers’ financial performance (Cox,
Fehr and Levitt, 2019; Fehr, McDermott and Cox, 2020) and increases in medical costs
(McCue, Hall and Liu, 2013; McCue and Hall, 2015; Cicala, Lieber and Marone, 2019;
Callaghan, Plummer and Wempe, 2020). Those papers link the regulation to insurers’
financial measures but fail to identify viable mechanisms for these effects.
One possible unintended effect of MLR regulation is that it disincentivizes in-
surance firms from containing costs when negotiating health service prices. Recent
papers model insurers as bargaining with health care providers on health service
prices to reduce the medical bills they pay to providers (Gowrisankaran, Nevo and
Town, 2015; Craig, Ericson and Starc, 2018; Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015; Barrette,
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2020). This bargaining process opens a channel for insur-
ers to change their cost containment behavior due to MLR regulation. When insurers
have relatively large bargaining power, they may realize that pursuing optimal so-
lutions with low service prices will make them non-compliant with the regulation.
Consequently, insurers may concede part of their bargaining power and profit, al-
lowing higher health service prices. Moreover, higher health service prices will lead
to higher out-of-pocket payment for consumers through a non-zero consumer cost-
sharing system and higher premiums if insurers price it in.
In this paper, I develop a model of how insurers negotiate health service prices
and determine premiums under MLR regulation. This model reveals the mechanism
through which MLR regulation affects the price bargaining equilibrium and insurers’
premium choices. By combining this model with demand estimation, I empirically
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show how the ACA MLR regulation affects negotiated prices, insurers’ cost, and con-
sumer welfare in the ACA Health Insurance Exchange Marketplace, without observing
pre-regulation data.
To estimate the effects of MLR regulation on price and consumer welfare, I start
by modeling the demand for insurance plans. I adopt a discrete choice model with
random coefficients from previous studies (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Nevo,
2001) to describe how consumers choose insurance plans based on premiums and
other plan features. Having estimated the demand for insurance plans, I build a two-
stage model with constraint on insurers’ pricing under MLR regulation. At the first
stage, the price negotiation stage, insurers and providers bargain on health service
prices, both aware of MLR regulation and know the demand function. The bargaining
equilibrium depends on the MLR regulation, the relative bargaining power of the two
sides, and the demand function. At the second stage, where insurers maximize their
profits by choosing premiums, I introduce MLR regulation as a constraint imposed
on insurers. This constraint will be binding if insurers’ firm-level MLRs are below
the threshold required by the regulation.
Following that, I show graphically how binding MLR regulation rules out bargain-
ing equilibria with low negotiated service prices. By imposing MLR regulation onto
the optimal prices and premium choices, I show how that premium-price combinations
with low negotiated price are no longer optimal because of the regulation.
This two-stage model provides a straightforward empirical approach for estimating
the effect of MLR regulation. I estimate this model using data from the individual
Health Insurance Exchange Marketplace, which has covered 10 million people every
year since it launched in 2014. After estimating the demand for health insurance
plans, I structurally estimate the effect of the ACA MLR regulation on health service
prices, insurers’ bargaining power, and fixed cost. Consistent with my theoretical
4
model, my estimates suggest that the MLR regulation leads to higher negotiated
prices and higher costs to insurers.
The estimates inform welfare analysis of counterfactual market settings that change
insurers’ pricing and the market outcomes. Based on those structural estimates, I in-
troduce price negotiation and the ACA MLR regulation sequentially to decompose
their effects on the negotiated prices, premiums, and welfare. Results from the coun-
terfactual analysis imply that if service prices are fixed at the no-regulation negotiated
level, insurance plans would be more affordable and cover more people. However,
when service prices are negotiated by insurers and health care providers, the MLR
regulation results in higher service prices and higher premiums. Therefore, consumers
will need to pay more out of pocket for both health care services and insurance plans.
One of this paper’s primary contributions is using a structural model to reveal
the mechanism by which MLR regulation can potentially affect insurers’ costs and
pricing. Building on the reduced-form evidence from previous studies (Cicala, Lieber
and Marone, 2019; Callaghan, Plummer and Wempe, 2020), this paper explicitly
shows how insurers respond to the ACA MLR regulation via price negotiation and
structurally estimates the effect of MLR regulation. This model has three attractive
features. First, by structurally estimating this model, I am able to draw conclu-
sions about the regulation’s effects on welfare. Second, this model does not require
data on negotiated prices, which are rarely available in the private insurance market.
Third, this structural estimation is more attractive when pre-regulation data is not
available—when the market started after the regulation was implemented.
The model structure and estimates inform a novel counterfactual analysis, which
investigates the interaction between MLR regulation and price negotiation. First, I
consider two counterfactual scenarios: one with price negotiation and no regulation;
and a second with MLR regulation but fixed service prices. By comparing these two
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scenarios with the real ACA exchange marketplace, I find that it is the combination of
the regulation and negotiation that leads to higher service prices, higher premiums,
and consequently a similar profit level but higher OOP payment for consumers. I
further test an alternative option—introducing a public insurance plan with 80%
MLR and removing MLR regulation for the other private plans. The results suggest
that such a public option could lower prices and improve consumer welfare.
This paper also contributes to the empirical studies of the ACA Exchange Mar-
ketplace. First, it estimates the effect of MLR regulation on the ACA Exchange Mar-
ketplace, which is absent in the existing literature. Second, the demand estimation in
this paper provides baseline estimates of demand in all the Federally-Facilitated Mar-
ketplaces (FFM), which complement previous studies that focus on the Massachusetts
pre-ACA marketplace (Ericson and Starc, 2015; Jaffe and Shepard, 2017) and that
focus on one or two state-based ACA exchange marketplaces (Abraham et al., 2017;
Tebaldi, 2017; Saltzman, 2019; Drake, 2019).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of existing related
literature. Section 3 describes the ACA MLR regulation and the Health Insurance Ex-
change Marketplace. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework along with graphs
illustrating the effect of MLR regulation on insurers’ pricing. Section 5 discusses
sample construction and provides descriptive statistics of the final sample. In Section
6 describes my empirical strategy and identification assumptions. Section 7 presents




This paper mainly relates to three strands of literature: rate-of-return regulation,
insurer-provider negotiation, and the ACA marketplace.
My work relates to a broad literature on rate-of-return regulation. Averch and
Johnson (1962) explain how rate-of-return regulation distorts resource allocation. In
the health care market, Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) shows the effect of the Medi-
care payment reform on the capital-labor ratios. Unlike those policies that focus on
the capital ratio, MLR regulation imposes a requirement on the ratio of variable cost
to revenue, approximately. Cicala, Lieber and Marone (2019) discuss the similarity
of the MLR regulation and the rate-of-return regulation with a single input.
With regard to MLR regulation, the literature is relatively small. Karaca-Mandic,
Abraham and Simon (2015) use pre-ACA data to show that the medical loss ratio
is a good measure of insurers’ price-cost margins. They also find that MLRs are
significantly lower in monopoly markets than in markets with two or more insurers.
Abraham, Karaca-Mandic and Simon (2014) find that MLRs increased in the indi-
vidual market in the first year after the ACA MLR regulation. McCue, Hall and Liu
(2013) assess the changes between 2010 and 2011 in insurers’ financial performance
and find that in 2011, the administrative cost ratios and the operating margins both
decreased, especially for individual health insurers. Later, McCue and Hall (2015)
study the data from the second year and find a continuous increase in MLRs and a
continuous decrease in the administrative cost ratios. Recently, Cicala, Lieber and
Marone (2019) use the difference-in-differences method to study the effect of the
ACA MLR regulation on medical cost and premiums. They find that the regulation
is associated with higher claims cost but has statistically no effect on the premiums.
Callaghan, Plummer and Wempe (2020) find similar consequences following the im-
plementation of the ACA MLR regulation. They show that the MLRs increased
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remarkably since 2011, and that increase in MLRs comes primarily from the increase
in claim cost, not the reduction in premium. Building on these reduced-form results,
I introduce the price negotiation between insurers and health care providers to the
model. Price negotiation is an essential channel for insurers to contain medical costs
and strategically maintain their compliance status under MLR regulation. Another
difference between my paper and existing studies is that those studies exploit the
pre-post variation, which does not exist for the Marketplace. To fill this vacuum, I
employ a structural model and use the cross-sectional variation to estimate the effect
of MLR regulation in the relatively new market.
My work also relates to papers that study the insurer-provider negotiation in
different institutional contexts. Reduced-form evidence shows that an increase in
bargaining power (due to mergers or measured by market HHI) relates to a reduction
in physician earnings and an increase in the substitution of nurses for physicians
(Dafny, Duggan and Ramanarayanan, 2012). Roberts, Chernew and McWilliams
(2017) show that low service prices are associated with large market shares. Cooper
et al. (2019) find that hospital prices are lower in higher concentrated insurer markets
and lower concentrated hospital markets. Trish and Herring (2015) find that high
concentration of provider markets is associated with the higher premiums after control
the concentration of insurance market. Using the bilateral Nash bargaining model
developed by Horn and Wolinsky (1988), researchers structurally examine the role
of price negotiation in the health care market. Grennan (2013, 2014) studies the
bargaining between hospitals and medical devices suppliers. Gowrisankaran, Nevo
and Town (2015) examine the bargaining between hospitals and insurers in Virginia.
Ho (2009), Ho and Lee (2017) and Ho and Lee (2019) examine the bargaining between
hospitals and insurers in California, primarily focusing on the network formation.
Those papers highlight the importance of the insurer-provider negotiation. Because
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of the time period studies, MLR regulation was absent in those papers. I incorporate
the price negotiation and MLR regulation in this paper, using a similar but richer
Nash bargaining model.
From the theoretical perspective, Aghadadashli, Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey (2016)
shows how bargaining power and demand elasticity affect the profit share in vertical
relations if upstream and downstream firms bargain over linear input prices. This
setting is very similar to the scenario where no regulation is imposed on the MLR.
Despite the deep and broad discussion of the rate-of-return regulation and the bar-
gaining model, very few studies discuss the consequences when such regulation is
implemented in a bargaining setting. Hendricks (1975) introduced the wage nego-
tiation when the rate-of-return of capital is regulated. My model suggests that the
division of profit between insurers and health care providers is distorted by MLR
regulation.
The third strand of literature that this paper relates to is the ACA health in-
surance exchange marketplace literature. Being a new market with new policies, the
Marketplace attracts many research works. A large part of them focus on the demand
estimation in this market. Abraham et al. (2017) found that demand was highly elas-
tic in 2014-2015. Tebaldi (2017) studies how the subsidy policy affects demand in
California. Saltzman (2019) estimates the demand for insurance plans in California
and Washington. Drake (2019) estimates the demand in 2017 California’s Market-
place. In this paper, I employ a discrete choice model with random coefficients to
estimate the demand in all the Federally-Facilitated Marketplaces, from 2014 to 2017.
My estimates fall within the range of previous estimates, including those from the
Massachusetts pre-ACA marketplace (Ericson and Starc, 2015; Jaffe and Shepard,
2017). The competition among insurers is another popular topic, spanning from the
relation between premium increase and monopoly (Parys, 2018) to insurers’ massive
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exits (Griffith, Jones and Sommers, 2018). This study raises another concern related
to insurers’ large bargaining power—increasing medical spending.
1.3 Background
1.3.1 The ACA Medical Loss Ratio Regulation
The Medical Loss Ratio regulation under the ACA requires each insurer to spend
80%—for individual and small group market—or 85%—for large group market—of
the total premium revenue on medical claims and health care quality improvement.
Insurers that do not reach the threshold must publicly disclose their non-compliance
and refund to their enrollees the portion of premium that exceeds the limit. If insurers
are not compliant for three years, they will not be allowed to enter the market.
The measurement is implemented at the insurer-market segment level. That is,
in each state, one insurer will have three MLRs if the firm participates in all three
segments—individual, small group, and large group. Along with MLRs, the compli-
ance status and rebates are also at the insurer-segment level.
More specifically, the MLR calculation includes a preliminary calculation of the




Total PremiumRevenue− Taxes, Licensing andRegulatory Fees
.
The core part and the most flexible part of MLR is the medical claims over premium
revenue. On average, the quality improvement expenses are only one percent of
the medical care claims, and the taxes and fees together count for 17% of premium
revenue.1 Although insurers have some degree of flexibility in what items to be
1Calculated by author, based on the 2011-2018 MLR reports, individual segment.
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counted as quality improvement expenses, it takes time and effort for them to get
approvals from the state commissioner.
Because of the uncertainty in medical claims, the regulation allows a credibility-
based adjustment of MLRs for small insurers,
AdjustedMLR = PreliminaryMLR+BaseCredibility Factor∗Deductible Factor.
The base credibility factor, as shown in Panel A of table 1.1, decreases in the number
of enrollees. Insurers having less than 1000 enrollees in a market are exempted from
the regulation. For insurers with 1,000 to 75,000 enrollees, adjusted MLRs are higher
than their preliminary ones.
The other adjustment factor is the deductible factor. The deductible line is a
threshold for enrollees below which enrollees need to pay 100% of the medical bills
by themselves. The deductible factor is calculated based on the average deductible
of all plans provided by the insurer, as shown in Panel B of table 1.1.
By the regulation, insurers need to provide rebates to their enrollees if their ad-
justed MLRs are above the 80% threshold in the individual market. Nationwide,
average annual rebates in the individual market were $260 million from 2011 to 2018.2
1.3.2 The ACA Health Insurance Exchange Marketplaces
The Health Insurance Exchange Marketplace is an online platform for individuals
and small groups to shop for health insurance plans. It opened in October 2013 when
people could enroll in health insurance plans for 2014. The exchange marketplace
is an important market for the individual insurance market. Every year, around 10
million individuals purchased their insurance at the Marketplace. That is 55% to 72%
of the total private individual market, depending on the year (Cox, Fehr and Levitt,
2019). Unlike in the large group markets, consumers and insurers in the Marketplace
2Calculated based on the 2011 to 2018 data from the CMS.
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do not bargain on the premiums or plan design. When people go to the platform,
they choose insurance plans by comparing predetermined plan characteristics listed
on the website, such as premiums, coverage rates, etc.
To ease the cross-plan comparison, the ACA requires insurers to classify all the
plans into five categories (four metal categories plus one “catastrophic” category)
based on plans’ actuarial values. The table 1.2 shows the actuarial values for each
category. The more precious the metal, the higher the fraction of medical bills the
insurance plan will cover. Among all five categories, silver is the most commonly
offered plan, no matter measured by the number of plans or the number of enrollees.
Two factors contribute here. On the insurer side, by regulation, insurers must provide
at least one silver plan to gain the entrance ticket. The second factor is that low-
income silver plan enrollees are eligible for a premium subsidy (Tebaldi, 2017).
Plans in the same metal category have the same actuarial values but could be
differentiated by other features such as premiums, deductibles, out-of-pocket maxi-
mums, and cost-sharing, as well as provider networks. Unfortunately, limited by the
data, I can not observe the provider network. However, premiums, metal categories,
and cost-sharing rates are much more salient than the network from consumers’ view.
Therefore, I leave the network feature for future research.
The marketplaces are state-level markets. Every state could choose between the
Federally-Facilitated Marketplace (FFM) and the state-based Marketplace. The FFM
is operated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). States
choosing FFM share similar marketplace design and regulatory environments. There-
fore, this paper focuses on the FFMs. From 2014 to 2017, 40 states participated in
the FFM for at least one year.
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1.4 Theoretical Framework
This section presents the model of insurance plan demand and insurers’ pricing with
MLR regulation. The model consists of three parts. In the first part, insurers and
health care providers bargain on health service prices. Following that, insurers deter-
mine premiums of the insurance plans and sell them in the market. Finally, consumers
shop for insurance plans based on premiums and plan characteristics. If a consumer
visits a health care provider, the insurer will pay part of the medical bill according to
the plan, and the consumer will pay the other part. The health care provider treats
the patient and gets payments from the insurer and the patient. In the following
subsections, I solve the model by backward induction.
1.4.1 Demand for insurance plans
To model the demand for insurance plans, I adopt a methodology set out by Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) that has been used in both health (Ho, 2009) and non-
health sectors (Nevo, 2001). I assume that the utility of individual i from choosing
plan j in state s and year t is




t + εijst, (1.1)
where Xjst is a vector of plan characteristics such as deductible and maximum Out-





fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. εijst is the idiosyncratic error term,
which follows EV Type I. αi and βi are random coefficients both of which consist of









+ ΠDist + Σνi,
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where Dist is a random draw of demographic characteristics in state s year t, and νi
follows a i.i.d. standard normal distribution. Π and Σ are the matrices of random
coefficients to be estimated.


























t , represents the mean utility
in market st. The following four terms, including the two summation terms, have
all the random coefficients. The random part could be considered as an individual
deviation from the market-level average.
The market share of plan j in market t is the probability that plan j provides
the highest utility to individuals. More specifically, based on the utility function, the









By multiplying the market share with the market size Mst, I obtain the demand
function of plan j in market st
Djst(φjst, Xjst) = Mstsjst.
1.4.2 Insurers’ premium choices
Insurers choose premiums to maximize their total profits given service prices and
MLR regulation. Consider an insurer f that provides a set of insurance plans Jf .
3
The objective in this part is to choose a set of premiums {φj}j∈J that maximizes the
total profit ΠIf with a MLR no lower than the threshold R̄. Following the regulation,
I introduce MLR regulation as a constraint imposed at insurer-level. Therefore, the
3To simplify the notation, I omit the subscript s and t for the rest of theoretical model.
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where φj is the premium of plan j, p̃j is the health service price, κ is plan j’s coverage
rate, θ is the fraction of enrollees who seek care, and CF is the fixed cost to the
insurer.













where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier, a measure of the shadow cost brought by MLR
regulation. By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, λ = 0 when issuers are compliant with
MLR regulation, λ > 0 otherwise. In the appendix section A, I prove that λ ∈ (0, 1)
if the regulation is binding.
The first order condition yields the relation between the optimal premiums and




p̃ κθ − J−1D (1.4)
where  indicates element-wise multiplication and J is the Jacobian matrix ofD with
respect to φ. This best response function shows that for insurers with MLRs above
the threshold required by the regulation, their optimal premiums equal the medical
cost plus a markup. Insurers that are non-compliant with the regulation will put less
weight on the medical cost for the premium choices.
In the appendix section A, I prove that λ ∈ (0, 1) is the sufficient and necessary
condition of 0 < 1−λ
1−λR̄ < 1. Putting the above discussion in an Averch-Johnson
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model, λ ranging between 0 and 1 is the crucial condition for the existence of the
Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962; Takayama, 1969; Stein and Borts,
1972).
1.4.3 Price negotiation
In the first stage, insurers and health care providers negotiate on health service price
p̃ . In practice, insurers usually bargain for a set of insurance plans at once. Thus,
I assume that plans provided by the same insurer in the same market have the same
service price, that is p̃j = p̃, ∀j ∈ Jf . Following previous studies (Crawford and Yu-
rukoglu, 2012; Grennan, 2013; Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town, 2015; Ho and Lee,
2017), I adopt the bilateral Nash bargaining model proposed in Horn and Wolinsky
(1988). I assume that each insurer-provider pair maximizes a bilateral Nash prod-
uct, taking the outcomes of the others as given. One important difference between
my model and previous ones is the constraint introduced by MLR regulation. This
regulation is well known to all the insurers and providers. Therefore, I assume that
the insurer’s profit in the Nash product is constrained.
Due to data limitations, I do not observe provider networks or the demand for
services for each provider. Thus, I use one provider to represent one market. This
assumption is strong if the paper focuses on provider network negotiation. It is less
concerning for my question, which focuses on a regulation imposed on insurer profits.
Including more providers will change alternative profits of both sides and give insurers
more bargaining power. It will not affect the conclusion that MLR regulation rules
out bargaining equilibrium with low prices.
Consider one insurer-provider pair. They seek to find the service price p̃ that









where τ is the bargaining parameter which measure insurer’s bargaining power. ΠI
and ΠH are insurer’s constrained profit and health care provider’s profit, respectively,
when they agree on price p̃. In the case of no agreement is reached, the insurer will
not enter this market and receive ΠI0; health care providers will see patients covered
by other insurance plans and receive ΠH0 . Therefore, the four relevant profit functions
in the bargaining problem are
ΠI =
∑
j∈Jf (φj − p̃jκjθ)Dj(φ)− C
F + λ
(∑











j∈Jf (p̃0 − c̃h)θDj.
(1.5)
c̃h is the service cost per patient to the health care provider, which is assumed to
be the same for patients covered by different insurance plans. p̃0 is the alternative
service price.
In the following subsections, I solve the Nash product maximization problem de-
fined above to obtain the negotiated prices at equilibrium. To better illustrate the
intuition, I start with a single-product scenario and provide the multi-product so-
lution after that. It is important to note that one insurer could and usually does
offer multiple plans in a market. When the regulation is imposed at the insurer-level,
insurers could make a large profit from one plan at the expense of profit of another
plan.
Single-product scenario
When the insurer provides only one insurance plan in the market, the objective func-
tion of the bargaining model could be simplified as
ΠNash =
[
(φ− p̃κθ)D − CF + λ(p̃κθD − R̄φD)
]τ
[(p̃− p̃0)θD](1−τ) .
By the envelope theorem and the relation in equation (1.4), the F.O.C. of the
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objective function above with respect to p yields,












As shown by the equation above, the equilibrium price consists of two parts—the
opportunity cost to health care provider p̃0 and a unit markup for the provider. The
latter part depends on the bargaining power τ , the effect of MLR regulation measured
by λ, and the demand function D(·). The negotiated price p̃ is decreasing in insurers’
bargaining power τ . Intuitively, insurers with larger bargaining power could push the
negotiated price lower and leave smaller profit to health care providers. The extreme
case is when an insurer has all the bargaining power, then the negotiated price will
equal to p̃0, and the provider will gain zero profit from having an agreement with
this insurer. The relation between the negotiated price and MLR regulation depends
on insurers’ best response function φ(·) and demand function D(·). From previous
section, I obtain the best response function φ(p̃). It allows me to solve out the φ′ in
the denominator, details are in the appendix section B. Applying the implicit function








The above equation shows that both the curvature of demand function and MLR
regulation affect how optimal premium responds to changes in serve price. Essentially,
the MLR regulation reduces the sensitivity of premium to the service price. As proved
in the Appendix section A, 0 < 1−λ
1−λR̄ < 1. Then premiums will be less responsive




In the real world, insurers provide more than one plan and strategically select pre-
miums to maximize total profit. Thus, it is necessary to generalize previous analysis
to a multi-product scenario. Similar to the single-product case, I apply the envelope
theorem and use the relation in equation (1.4) to obtain the equation below, which
is analog to equation (1.6),









The equation above explicitly shows the effect of regulation (λ) and bargaining power
(τ) on the service price. The difference between single-product and multi-product
solutions is the Jacobian matrix J . When this matrix degenerates to a diagonal
matrix, solutions are the same regardless of the number of plans offered by an insurer.
When the off-diagonal entries in the Jacobian matrix are not zero, plans subsidize
each other and achieve the MLR requirement as a whole.
For the ∂φ
∂p
, I again use the implicit function theorem and derive the following








= − 1− λ
1− λR̄
Jκ. (1.9)
Hj is the Hessian matrix of plan j’s demand function with respect to premiums of
plans offered by the same insurer. The term in the large parentheses corresponds to
the A in equation (1.7). The technical details are in the appendix section B.
1.4.4 Graphical illustration
I use the framework sketched above to provide a graphical representation of the
effect of MLR regulation. The graph shows a simplified situation where the insurer
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provides only one plan. This simplification affects the estimation but does not change
the general conclusion that MLR regulation rules out bargaining equilibria with low
negotiated service prices. In addition, I assume that the profit will be zero for both
the insurer and the provider if they do not reach any agreement on the service price.
Setup
Consider an insurer I that offers one insurance plan, and a health care provider H that
offers one medical service. In the absence of MLR regulation, both the profit maxi-
mization problem and the Nash product maximization problem are unconstrained.
More specifically, at the first stage, the insurer and the provider maximize the














Price negotiation and premium choice
As shown in the previous sections, I solve this simplified model by backward induction.
The solution from the second stage is insurer’s best response function,
φ(p) = pκθ − D
D′
. (1.10)
This is a special version of equation (1.4)—when MLR regulation is not effective. The
second term on the right-hand-side is positive as I assumed the demand decreases in
the premium. The optimal premium is increasing in service price if and only if
2(D′)2 −DD′′ > 0. This condition is satisfied when the demand function is concave
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or mildly convex, such as a linear demand function and a logit-form demand function.
Appendix section C discusses the conditions for an increasing best response function.
Having the best response in mind, the insurer negotiates the service price with
the health care provider. The negotiated price solution in this simplified scenario is













When the insurer has all of the bargaining power, τ → 1, the service price is equal
to the cost of the provider. In this case, the provider does not enjoy any profit while
the insurer takes all the profit. When the health care provider has all the bargaining
power, τ = 0, the equilibrium price is p̄ = ch − D(φ(p̄))D′(φ(p̄))φ′(p̄) . This is the highest price
that the insurer would accept. Any price higher than p̄ means negative profit for the
insurer.
Figure 1·1 shows the insurer’s best response and the corresponding profit. On
the left panel, the x-axis represents the negotiated price; the y-axis represents the
premium. When the insurer and the provider bargain on the price, the equilibrium
price moves between ch and p̄ along the x-axis. The location of the negotiated price
depends on the bargaining power τ . When τ = 1, p = ch. When τ = 0, p = p̄.
For each possible negotiated price, the blue curve shows the insurer’s best premium
choice as a response to the price. Along the best response curve, points A and C
correspond to the equilibria when the insurer has all the bargaining power and none
bargaining power, respectively. The dashed line pκθ represents the marginal cost to
the insurer. On the right panel, the black curve is the demand function for insurance
plans. Then the profit could be represented by a rectangle below the demand curve.
The real profit equals the premium revenue minus the medical cost minus the fixed
cost. To simplify the figure, I show the raw profit—real profit plus fixed costs—rather
than the real profit. In other words, the raw profit is the product of demand and
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the difference between the premium and marginal cost. This simplification does not
affect the comparison between profits corresponding to different (p, φ) pairs within
a firm. For example, as shown in the figure, the yellow shaded area represents πA,
the raw profit corresponding to the point A where the insurer has all the bargaining
power.
Effect of MLR regulation
When MLR regulation takes effect, the insurance firm maximizes its profit subject to
a minimal ratio R̄ for medical loss. That is, for the insurer,
pκθ ≥ R̄φ(D).
Figure 1·2 shows how the regulation affects the bargaining equilibrium and in-
surer’s optimal premium choice. The orange line represents the MLR threshold, and
the area underneath the line, the orange shared area, indicates all the eligible (p, φ)
pairs under the regulation. In other words, if the insurer has little bargaining power
so that the optimal solution without MLR regulation locates between points B and
C, then the insurer will not be affected by the regulation. However, when the no-
regulation optimal premium choice is between points A and B, that is when the
insurer has large bargaining power and low negotiated price, the insurer has to either
lower the premium and/or concede part of her profit to the provider to reach the
MLR requirement. Continue using the example in the Figure 1·1. The MLR at point
A is below the regulatory threshold. If the service price is fixed, the insurer will have
no choice other than moving to the point A′ and gain the profit ΠA′ indicated by the
green shaded area. When the service price is negotiated, the insurer could move to
other locations between points A′ and B. For example, the insurer could move to
point A′′ and gain the profit ΠA′′ indicated by the blue shaded area. Where locates
the new optimal choice is an empirical question. It depends on the profit correspond-
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ing to each point, which is related to the curvature of the demand function. As for
the premium, it could become lower or higher than φA. Again, it depends on the
relation between the regulation threshold and the curvature of the demand function.
This simple model shows that if an insurer has little bargaining power and a
high negotiated price, MLR regulation will not affect the price. For an insurer with
large bargaining power and a low negotiated price, MLR regulation will rule out the
(p, φ) combination that the insurer initially chooses. Consequently, the service price
increases under the above condition. Whether the premium increases or decreases
depends on the relative concavity of the demand function to the regulation threshold.
1.5 Data
To empirically estimate the effect of MLR regulation, I apply the model developed
in the previous section to the ACA Health Insurance Exchange Marketplaces. I use
data from multiple sources to construct my sample. The two primary data sources
this paper relies on are healthcare.gov and the Center for Consumer Information
& Insurance Oversight (CCIIO). The former is the website where consumers shop
for their insurance plans. From the website, I gather data on premiums and other
plan characteristics. In this dataset, each plan has a state-specific plan ID, which is
uniquely defined by state, insurer, and plan.
From the CCIIO, I obtain the enrollment data and insurers’ MLR reports. The
unit of observation in the enrollment data is state-plan. I merge the enrollment data
with the plan characteristics by plan IDs and generate a dataset of demand, premium,
and plan characteristics. A caveat with the enrollment data is that the number of
enrollees is aggregated to the state level, not at county or rating area level. Therefore,
I use the average premium as the state-level premium. Insurers’ MLR reports are filed
annually and contain financial information such as MLR, total revenue, total cost,
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and other insurer information such as the Employer Identification Number (EIN),
whether it is for-profit, etc. These data are merged to the main dataset by state-
specific issuer IDs. In the following analysis, I use this state-specific issuer ID as the
insurer ID. The EIN is used for generating instruments, described in section 1.6.1.
To complete the dataset, I obtain the market and population demographics data
from the Area Health Resources Files (AHRF). More specifically, I estimate the
income distribution in each state using the statistics of uninsured people’s income
groups and use the number of uninsured people as the market size.
The final sample has 7,570 unique plan IDs offered by 306 insurers (238 EINs) in
149 state-year markets. That are 12,384 plan-year observations. Table 1.3 shows the
descriptive statistics of key variables in the sample.
As mentioned earlier, plan features could vary within the same metal category. In
this paper, I include the following plan characteristics. The deductible is the amount
an enrollee pays for health care services before the insurance plan starts to pay. After
reaching the deductible line, the enrollee will pay either a fixed amount—copayment—
for the health care service or a fixed fraction—coinsurance—of the total spending.
When the total out-of-pocket payment—the sum of deductibles, copayments, and
coinsurance—reaches the Out-Of-Pocket maximum (OOP max), the insurance plan
will cover all spendings after that.
Figure 1·3 shows the average of premiums and other plan characteristics by metal
category and year. Panel A shows that, on average, premium increases from catas-
trophic plans to platinum plans. It also increases significantly over the years. For the
deductible and OOP max, the difference across metal categories is significant, but the
over-year changes are much smaller than those in premiums. Panel D and E present
the copayment and coinsurance, respectively. Because only 52.35% of plans have co-
payment and 38.53% have coinsurance, the variation of these two plan characteristics
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is much larger. As Parys (2018) shows, premiums increased significantly from year
to year. The time trend of other plan characteristics is relatively flat. This variation
in premiums and plan characteristics is one of the key identification sources in my
analysis.
Another important source of variation in my analysis is from MLRs. Figure 1·4
shows the MLRs reported by insurers from 2014-2017. Grey bars and red contour
bars present the preliminary MLR and credibility-adjusted MLR, respectively. Most
of the insurers have MLRs between 0.8 and 1. Those after the credibility-adjustment
are higher than the preliminary ones overall. Callaghan, Plummer and Wempe (2020)
find that, all markets pooled together from 2011-2015, MLRs of both non-compliant
and compliant plans move towards to the threshold over years. In the Marketplace,
from 2014-2017, the width of MLR distribution does not shrink and it is relatively
continuous at threshold 0.8, as shown in the appendix figure A1.
This study grapples with the same two major data limitations as in other studies.
The first one is that I do not observe negotiated prices. To address this problem, I
structurally introduce insurer premium choices into the bargaining solution. Second,
because the marketplace started in 2014, three years later than the regulation, pre-
regulation data do not exist. Therefore, reduced-form approaches are not applicable
in this case.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I present the empirical estimation strategy which is based on the
theoretical model developed in section 1.4.
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1.6.1 Demand for insurance plans
In the discrete choice model for the insurance plan demand, a couple of variables and
distributions need to be further specified. First, the plan characteristics Xj includes
plan j’s deductible, OOP max, copayment, coinsurance, metal category, and plan
type. These are the most salient plan characteristics that consumers could observe
in the marketplace.4 Second, for the demographic distribution, I use income group
relative to the federal poverty level. Another important variable for the demand
estimation is the market size Mt. Following previous studies (Tebaldi, 2017; Drake,
2019; Saltzman, 2019), I assume that the outside option is uninsured. The uninsured
population under age 65 represents the “demand” of outside option.
The premium is endogenous in the model. Therefore, I use three sets of instru-
ment variables together to mitigate the endogeneity problem. The first set contains
the average plan characteristics of plans offered by the rivals in the same market.
Those instruments are missing in single-insurer markets. Therefore, I use an indica-
tor of single-insurer markets and replace missing values by zero in the average plan
characteristics. The second set of instruments includes the average premiums and
the average plan characteristics of plans offered by the same insurer in other markets.
The same insurer is identified by the EIN. Because there are local insurers that only
participated in one market (i.e., one year in one state), I use a similar method to
deal with missing values—add an indicator of single-market insurer and assign zero
to those missing values in the average instruments. The last set of instruments in-
cludes cost shifters. It includes the average Medicare wage index across all core-based
statistical areas where the plan was offered.
4Due to the potential collinearity issue, the main specification leaves OOP max out. As OOP
max is a threshold of the accumulative amount of patient OOP payments, only patients who use
lots of health care services will reach this threshold. Therefore, I assume consumers care less about
the OOP max than other features.
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1.6.2 Effect of MLR regulation on marginal cost
Before estimating the full model, I examine the effect of MLR regulation on insurers’
marginal cost, without including the price negotiation.
Insurers’ best response function, the equation (1.4), establishes the relation be-








with mc = p̃κθ and mr = φ + J−1D. From the demand estimation, the marginal
revenue mrj is calculable. However, the marginal cost is unobservable. Therefore, I
adopt a widely used assumption about marginal cost—that the log of marginal cost
is a linear function of product characteristics. With this assumption, I estimate the
effect of MLR regulation by the following equation






+ wjγ + ωj, (1.12)
where 1(Rebatef(j)) is an indicator of whether the insurer f needs to rebate, wj is a
vector of plan characteristics including same variables as in Xj, λ measures the effect
of MLR regulation on non-compliant insurers. From the discussion in the section 1.4,
I expect that λ > 0. A positive λ implies that MLR regulation breaks the efficient
equality–marginal cost = marginal revenue. Affected by the MLR, marginal cost is
higher than the marginal revenue.
1.6.3 Effect of MLR regulation and price negotiation
Using the model developed in section 1.4, I derive a set of moments for the estimation.
I start by adapting my model to the available data. The heterogeneity in the service
prices is an interesting topic but requires a richer dataset. As this paper focuses
on the essence of price negotiation, I use one representative price for all the health
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services. More specifically, I use the average spending as a proxy of the service price.
Moreover, due to the data limitation, I use the average spending per enrollee instead
of the average spending per patient. In this way, θ is not identifiable, thus, I use p and
p0 instead of p̃θ and p̃0θ, respectively. For the alternative price p0, I use the average
Medicaid spending per enrollee as a proxy and denote it as pMCD. This payment can
be considered as the lowest payment a provider receives.
One big challenge for the estimation is that negotiated prices are not observed.
In this part of estimation, instead of making an assumption about marginal cost,
I combine equation (1.4) and equation (1.8) to eliminate service price in the final
estimation moments.
After those changes, I am able to jointly estimate λ, τ , and CF using two-step
GMM under the assumption that E[Z ′ξ] = 0. The error term ξ is defined as
ξ =
τ(1− λR̄)(φ+ J−1D)TD
(1− λR̄)[J−1D]TD + CF
− τ(1− λ)p
MCDκTD










In the equation, φ and D are observed, J and H are calculated based on the de-
mand estimates. Appendix section B shows how J and H are calculated. For the
instruments in Z, I use the number of firms in the market, year dummies, and state
dummies.
1.7 Empirical Results
1.7.1 Demand for insurance plans
Before estimating the demand with random coefficients, I explore the relation between
demand and plan characteristics by nested-logit regressions.
ln(sjst)− ln(s0st) = αlnφjst +X ′jstβ + σlnsj/g + γss + γtt + γ
f
f(j) + ξj (1.14)
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In the equation, sjst and s0st are market shares of plan j and outside option in
state s and year t, respectively. φjst is plan j’s average premium. Xjst is a vector
of plan characteristics. sj/g is the nested market share where g represents the metal
category that plan j belongs to. γs and γt are state fixed effects and year fixed effects,
respectively. γff(j) is insurer fixed effect, f(j) indicates the insurer who provides plan
j. Since the conditional market share sj/g is also endogenous, I use the number of
plans in the nest as an additional instrument.
Table 1.4 presents the estimates of demand for insurance plans in the exchange
marketplace. The first two columns show the results of nested-logit regressions while
the following columns show the results with random coefficients. In columns (1) and
(3), plan characteristics include deductible and OOP max. In the other columns,
I replace OOP max with copayment and coinsurance. Across all the specifications,
consumers significantly dislike high premium. After controlling for the copayment
and coinsurance rates, consumers significantly prefer low deductible. It is interesting
to note that consumers significantly prefer the copayment feature and do not care
much about the amount of copayment. As for the coinsurance, consumers do not like
this feature and are very sensitive to the coinsurance level. This finding echoes what
Loewenstein et al. (2013) find—consumers understand copayment the best among all
the four plan features. In other words, consumers prefer insurance plans that they
can easily understand.
In the following study, I use the model and estimates in column (5) as the demand
for insurance plans. More specifically, I use those estimates to calculate Jacobian and
Hessian matrices of demand as well as the derivatives of the best response function
with respect to the health service price.
Based on the selected specification, the average own-price elasticity is -2.23 (SD
0.51), which locates well in the range of estimates in previous studies (-10.6, -1.7)
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(Abraham et al., 2017; Saltzman, 2019; Drake, 2019; Tebaldi, 2017). Figure 1·5
shows the kernel density of own-price elasticity by metal category. From the least
to the most generous category, mean elasticity does not move much while the width
of distribution shrinks. One outlier is the “catastrophic” category. Enrollees who
choose plans in this category are on the borderline between purchasing and not. The
coverage of “catastrophic” plans is very limited. Thus the price elasticity is relatively
high.
1.7.2 Effect of MLR regulation
From the demand estimation, I obtain plan-level marginal revenue mrj = φj +
[J−1D]jj. Figure 1·6 shows the distribution of marginal revenue for compliant and
non-compliant insurers . In the figure, the marginal revenue of plans provided by
non-compliant insurers are higher than that of plans provided by compliant insurers.
Using these calculated marginal revenues, I estimate equation (1.12) to tease out the
effect of MLR regulation on marginal cost by non-linear least squares.
As shown in the table 1.5, λ is significantly different from zero, regardless of model
specifications. From column (1) to (4), I add year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and
firm characteristics one by one. Inspired by previous studies (Dafny, 2019; McCue,
Hall and Liu, 2013), I include a not-for-profit indicator and the number of counties
the insurer enters as firm characteristics. With more controls, the magnitude of the
effect reduces. Column (5) includes the same control variables as column (4) except
using OOP max instead of copayment and coinsurance. The estimate of λ is robust
to this change of plan characteristics. In the setting of column (4), λ = 0.0568 means
that, compared to compliant insurers, 9.7% of non-compliant insurers’ marginal cost
is induced by the regulation given plan design. In other words, the ratio of marginal
cost to marginal revenue equals one when there is no regulation. When the MLR
regulation is effective, this ratio increases to 1.097, which suggests an inefficiency.
30
That increase could be driven by an increase of marginal cost and/or a decrease of
the marginal revenue at equilibrium.
Among all the plan characteristics, the most significant contributor is copayment.
As expected, higher copayment relates to lower marginal cost and, therefore, lower
marginal revenue. The constant term estimates, shown in the last row in the table,
implying that the marginal cost of the base plan—a plan without any cost-sharing in
the catastrophic category—is about $1700, on average.
1.7.3 Effect of MLR regulation and price negotiation
Combining the demand estimates with the full model, I jointly estimate the bargaining
parameter, the effect of MLR regulation, and insurers’ fixed cost. Table 1.6 presents
the results with different specifications. Because the estimation in this part relies
on the demand estimation discussed in section 1.7.1. I use a parametric bootstrap
method to calculate the standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). More specifi-
cally, I assume that the demand parameters follow the distributions estimated by the
demand model, and bootstrap based on those estimated distributions to evaluate the
accuracy of the point estimates in this section.
Column (1) in Table 1.6 shows the baseline estimates, where I assume that insurers
have the same bargaining parameter and same fixed cost. Following that, I allow
non-compliant insurers to have a different bargaining parameter where τ1 measures
the difference. Results displayed in column (2) suggest that non-compliant insurers
have an insignificantly lower bargaining power although the magnitude is large—28%
less powerful than compliant insurers on average. In column (3), all insurers have
the same bargaining parameter, and not-for-profit insurers could have a different
fixed cost. The estimates suggest that, compared to for-profit insurers, not-for-profit
insurers have higher fixed cost. The last column combines the specification of columns
(2) and (3).
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The first row presents the estimates of λ—a measure of the effect of MLR regula-
tion. The results are relatively robust to changes in the specifications. To interpret λ,
I use estimates in column (4) to calculate the negotiated service prices with and with-
out the MLR regulation, assuming all other settings are unchanged. Table 1.7 shows
a summary of the calculated negotiated prices. The average negotiated price of com-
pliant insurers does not change when there is the MLR regulation. For non-compliant
insurers, the MLR regulation raises the negotiated price by $86.62. Those changes in
negotiated price translate into $21.3 million and $62.8 million more OOP payment
for patients enrolled in compliant plans and non-compliant plans every year, respec-
tively. This extra OOP payment is for health care services, excluding any changes
in the premiums. To answer what would premiums be and what is the total welfare
effect, I conduct the following counterfactual analysis.
1.8 Counterfactual Analysis
To study the welfare effect and to decompose the total effect into a regulation effect
and a bargaining effect, I compare price and premiums at equilibrium in the following
three scenarios:
1. No regulation on profit and health service prices are negotiated;
2. MLR regulation is effective, but prices are fixed at no-regulation negotiated
level;
3. MLR regulation is effective, and prices are negotiated;
Public health insurance option is a widely debated option for improving health care
affordability. In the counterfactual analysis, following the previous three scenarios, I
constructed the fourth one to test if a public option could be a solution here.
4. No regulation on profit, health service prices are negotiated, one public option.
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In all the scenarios, I constructed a synthetic market of 100,000 individuals and three
insurers. Each insurer provides one silver plan with different plan characteristics
shown in the table below.
Insurer1 (plan A) Insurer2 (plan B) Insurer3 (plan C)
Deductible ($) 2000 3000 5000
Copayment ($) 10 25 30
In the first scenario, there is no regulation on insurer profit. Insurers and health
care providers negotiate service prices, and insurers set the premium to maximize
the profit. This setting would mimic the market if the Marketplace existed before
the MLR regulation. When there is no regulation on the profit, insurers will exploit
the demand and pricing freely. The top panel in Table 1.8 shows the solution at
equilibrium in this scenario. The negotiated service prices are around $2700, and the
optimal premiums are around $2600. Of the 100,000 individuals in the market, about
52,000 purchased insurance plans. The uninsurance rate is higher in this constructed
market than in the real market because I eliminate cheap plans for simplification.
Together, it means around $45 million of premium revenue and $33 million of medical
loss for one insurer.
The second scenario is when the MLR regulation is effective, and prices are fixed
at the no-regulation level. The no-regulation level is the negotiated result when there
is no MLR regulation, as in the first scenario. This setting allows me to measure how
much the regulation would bring down premiums if the price negotiation channel were
shut down. With the same level of service prices, because of the MLR regulation,
insurers have to lower premiums to achieve the requirement. Therefore, premiums in
this scenario are lower than those in the first scenario. Consequently, demands and
medical loss are higher than in the previous case. Despite the increase in demands,
the reduction in premiums drives to lower premium revenues for all three insurers.
The second panel in Table 1.8 presents the results at equilibrium in this setting.
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Comparing to scenario 1, if service prices were fixed, the MLR regulation would limit
insurer profit and make the insurance plans more affordable for more people. The
average enrollee would spend $224 less on insurance plans. With lower premiums,
1.6% of individuals would become insured.
The third scenario uses the real world settings that described in the previous
sections—the MLR regulation is effective, and service prices are negotiated by insurers
and health care providers. In the constructed market, as shown by the third panel in
Table 1.8, the negotiated prices increase to $4200, and the premiums increase to $3700.
Although the demands reduce by more than one thousand for each plan, the premium
revenues are higher than the other scenarios. The pre-post regulation comparison
shows that, changing from scenario 1 to 3, insurers will allow higher service prices,
concede part of the profit to health care providers, and increase premiums. Although
the demand drops, the total profit remains at the same level as before regulation.
In the last scenario, plan C is a public option with a fixed MLR at 0.8 level and
the other two plans are private plans that are not regulated by the MLR regulation
5. As shown in the bottom panel in Table 1.8, insurers bargain hard to lower health
service price. For the public option, because it has a fixed MLR, the premium is set
at a low level, like in the second scenario. For the private options, premiums are lower
than the no-regulation level because of the competition induced by the public option
in the insurance market. With the public option, both health insurance plans and
health care services become more affordable compare to the no-regulation scenario.
Figure 1·7 shows the changes in consumer welfare if the market setting changes
from that of the pre-regulation scenario to the other three scenarios. When health
service prices were fixed at the pre-regulation level, MLR regulation could save con-
sumers $7.95 million for insurance plans while slightly more spending, $1.31 million
on health care services due to higher demand. Together, the consumer welfare in-
5Results are robust regardless which plan is turned into the public option.
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creases by 4%. When health service prices are negotiated under the MLR regulation,
consumers will need to pay $67 million more out of pocket—–$47 million for the in-
surance plans and the other $20 million for health care services. The last pair of bars
shows the savings if we have a ”regulated” public option instead of regulating private
insurers on their MLR. The results suggest that the introduction of the public option
could save consumers $1.75 million for medical services and $7.18 million for health
insurance plans, which in total is a 5% increase in consumer welfare.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper builds a structural model of the effects of Medical Loss Ratio regulation on
health service prices and insurance premiums. The model incorporates the regulation
and insurer-provider price negotiation. This constrained bargaining model reveals
how MLR regulation leads to higher health service prices via price negotiation. I
also provide a graphical representation of the effect, which illustrates the intuition
that MLR regulation rules out bargaining equilibria with low service prices. Vertical
relation—e.g., price negotiations—could open a channel through which the effect of
regulations passes from the regulated side to the other side. Particularly, in markets
where the private provision of public service is essential, a successful regulation needs
to align private firms’ incentives with the social optimum.
Applying this model to the ACA Health Insurance Exchange Marketplace, I es-
timate the effect of MLR regulation on prices, premiums, and patient welfare. My
estimates imply that, along with the increase in MLRs, the MLR regulation results
in higher health service prices and higher patient OOP payments. If MLR regulation
were implemented in a market where health care service prices were fixed, consumers
would spend less out of pocket. However, because of the insurer-provider price nego-
tiation, consumers need to spend more when MLR regulation is effective.
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This paper examines pricing behavior in a static and partial equilibrium frame-
work, assuming that demand for health care services only varies proportionally to the
demand for insurance plans, without adjusting for any preemptive pricing behavior
among insurers. Therefore, the conclusion from this paper should be interpreted as
short-run effects. As data availability increases over time, future work could extend
my model by adding dynamic components.
I also do not consider heterogeneity among health care providers within a market.
Estimates in this paper provide an average estimation of the effect of MLR regulation
on health service prices. Both the heterogeneity in the negotiation—e.g., hospitals
and independent practice groups might have different bargaining parameters—and
the heterogeneity in the menu of service prices—e.g., effects on low-value services and
high-value services might be different—could help understand the impact of this reg-
ulation on the provider market. However, I argue that this heterogeneity is a second-
order concern relative to the direct effects of MLR regulation on insurer pricing, as
it does not significantly alter insurer behavior. Future work could build this hetero-
geneity into the model; alternatively, future work might integrate provider networks
into estimation. Ho and Lee (2017) and Ho and Lee (2019) model the bargaining on
network formation before the ACA. More data of the provider market is needed to
introduce this into the model empirically.
From the perspective of patients, a better health outcome could be more important
than the OOP payment. It is still unclear whether the higher medical spending
translates into better health status. To answer this question, researchers will need
good measurements of service utilization and health outcomes.
Besides its MLR regulation, there are many other provisions under the ACA.
Some of them—such as risk-corridors, reinsurance, and the individual mandate—
could affect this paper’s estimates. For example, the individual mandate could affect
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insurer pricing because the penalty level affects the outside option for consumers and,
therefore, the curvature of demand function. It is an exciting agenda to incorporate
those related provisions and tease out the effect of each provision and how they
interact with each other.
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Figure 1·1: Insurer’s best response and the negotiated health service
price
Notes: This figure represents the negotiated prices and insurer’s premium choice when the
insurer only provides one insurance plan without MLR regulation. The negotiated price varies
along the x-axis in the left panel. Insurer’s bargaining power τ affects where the negotiated
price locates between ch and p̄. The solid curve in the left panel depicts insurer’s best response
of premium to price. Points A and C indicates what are the negotiated price and premium when
insurer has all bargaining power or none bargaining power, respectively. In the right panel, the
solid curve is the demand for insurance plan. The shaded area shows the profit (including fixed
cost) if the insurer has the max bargaining power.
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Figure 1·2: Impact of MLR regulation
Notes: This figure presents how the MLR regulation affects the choice of negotiated price and
premium. The solid line in the left panel represents MLR regulation threshold and the shaded
triangle below that line indicates all the eligible choices of price and premiums under MLR
regulation.
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Figure 1·3: Variation in premium and plan characteristics, by metal
category and year
Notes: This figure shows the variation of premium, deductible, Out-Of-Pocket maximum, co-
payment, and coinsurance, by metal category and year. The bars show the 95% confidence
interval of the means.
40
Figure 1·4: Distribution of MLRs
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of medical loss ratios. Data is from the MLR
reports. The sample includes insurers in the Federally-Facilitated Marketplace from 2014-2017.
Grey solid bars present the preliminary MLRs. The red contoured bars present the credibility-
adjusted MLRs.
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Figure 1·5: Distribution of own-price elasticity of demand
Notes: This figure presents the empirical density distribution of own-price elasticity of demand
for insurance plan. The elasticities are calculated based on the demand estimation. Unit
observation is plan.
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Figure 1·6: Empirical density of estimated marginal revenue
Notes: This figure presents the density distribution of marginal revenues at plan-year level.
The marginal revenues are calculated based on the demand estimation. The compliance status
are at insurer-year level.
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Figure 1·7: Consumer welfare changes compared to the pre-regulation
scenario
Notes: This figure shows the changes in consumer welfare by type of spending. Comparing to
the pre-regulation scenario simulated in the counterfactual analysis, the two bars, red and blue,
for each of the other three scenarios present the changes in patients’ medical service spending
and insurance spending, respectively.
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Table 1.1: Adjustment factors of medical loss ratio
Panel A. Base credibility factor















Notes: This table shows the two adjustment factors used in the ACA MLR regulation.
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Notes: This table presents names and corresponding actuarial values of the five categories of
plan in the Marketplace.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics of key variables
Panel A. Continuous variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
N enrollees 2663 9953 11 274,497
Premium ($) 3939.08 1189.48 1008 13,087
Deductible ($) 3645.06 2153.96 0 7150
Copayment ($) 20.54 17.09 0 150
Coinsurance (percent) 16.6 16.65 0 80
OOP max ($) 5773.81 1443.86 500 7150
Plan market share (percent) 0.308 0.906 0.00019 28.445


















Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of key variables. Full name of plan type:
Exclusive provider organization (EPO), Health maintenance organization (HMO), Point-of-
service (POS), Preferred provider organization (PPO)
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Table 1.4: Results of demand estimation
Nested-logit Random Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(premium) -0.565 -0.713 -2.32 -2.19 -0.615
(0.101) (0.086) (0.416) (0.34) (0.803)
log(deductible) 0.002 -0.008 0.01 -0.031 -0.028
(0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
log(OOP max) 0.099 0.475
(0.027) (0.073)
Copayment 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Coinsurance -0.225 -0.956 -0.99
(0.058) (0.193) (0.216)
Having copayment 0.00071 0.199 0.196
(0.017) (0.056) (0.067)




Metal Category FE X X X X X
Plan Type FE X X X X X
State FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
RC premium X X X
RC premium (interact with demo) X
Notes: This table presents the results of demand estimation. The first two columns are from
nested-logit regressions with metal category being nest. The following three columns report
estimates of discrete choice model with random coefficients. Columns (3) and (4) allow for
random coefficients for the premium. Column (5) additionally includes individual income level
and allows it to interact with the premium.
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Table 1.5: Effect of MLR regulation on marginal cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
λ 0.120 0.119 0.0832 0.0568 0.0554
(0.00725) (0.00742) (0.00830) (0.00821) (0.00821)
log(deductible) 0.00909 0.00749 0.00472 0.00889 0.00972
(0.00490) (0.00485) (0.00436) (0.00432) (0.00425)
Copayment -0.000724 -0.00132 -0.00254 -0.00191
(0.000618) (0.000621) (0.000553) (0.000549)
Coinsurance rate -0.0488 -0.0861 0.140 0.131
(0.0630) (0.0622) (0.0593) (0.0597)
Having copayment -0.0166 -0.0109 0.0430 0.0215
(0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0171) (0.0171)
Having coinsurance 0.0765 0.0652 -0.0248 0.0116
(0.0196) (0.0191) (0.0168) (0.0171)
log(OOP max) 0.0431
(0.0220)
Constant 7.257 7.341 7.471 7.441 7.051
(0.0537) (0.0532) (0.0803) (0.0731) (0.201)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
N 10,859 10,859 10,859 10,859 10,859
R2 0.022 0.035 0.278 0.302 0.300
Notes: This table show the estimates of the effect of MLR regulation on marginal cost, without
structurally including the price negotiation. Column (1) shows the baseline estimates, which
include metal level fixed effects and plan type fixed effects. From column (2) to column (4), I
add year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and firm characteristics one-by-one. Column (5) has
same control variables as column (4) except that column (5) use OOP max instead of copayment
and coinsurance as plan characteristics. λ is the measure of the effect of MLR regulation.
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Table 1.6: Effect of MLR regulation and bargaining
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of MLR Regulation λ 0.133 0.143 0.145 0.152
(0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.009)
Nash Bargaining Parameters τ0 0.498 0.428 0.31 0.403
(0.028) (0.591) (0.03) (0.041)
τ1 -0.1 -0.035
(0.089) (0.216)
Insurer Fixed Cost CF 1.285 1.227 0.255 1.226
(0.041) (1.366) (0.065) (0.035)
CFNFP 0.047 0.063
(0.02) (0.015)
N observations 796 796 796 796
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the full model. In columns (2) and (4), I allow non-
compliant insurers having a different bargaining parameter. τ1 is the estimate of the difference.
In column (3) and (4), not-for-profit insurers could have different level of fixed costs. Standard
errors are calculated by the parametric bootstrapping.
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Table 1.7: Changes in price due to MLR regulation
(1) (2) (3)
Compliant Non-compliant Pooled
Price w/o MLR regulation
Mean 2659.5 2952.56 2680.42
Std. Dev. 5152.09 6312.45 5243.65
Price w/ MLR regulation
Mean 2659.31 3039.17 2686.42
Std. Dev. 5138.87 6828.58 5277.97
Change in price
Mean -0.20 86.62 6.00
Std. Dev. 39.53 561.54 156.31
N Observations 10,629 817 11,446
Notes: This table shows the changes in negotiated price due to the MLR regulation, assuming
premium and demand unchanged.
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Table 1.8: Statistics of the counterfactual scenarios
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3
Scenario 1. No regulation, with bargaining
Service price (in thousands) 2.73 2.72 2.71
Premium (in thousands) 2.61 2.61 2.6
Demand (in thousands) 17.61 17.54 17.39
Premium revenue (in millions) 45.95 45.72 45.23
Medical loss (in millions) 33.68 33.45 32.96
Scenario 2. With regulation, no bargaining
Service price (in thousands) 2.73 2.72 2.71
Premium (in thousands) 2.39 2.38 2.37
Demand (in thousands) 18.06 18.05 18.03
Premium revenue (in millions) 43.19 43.03 42.72
Medical loss (in millions) 34.55 34.43 34.18
Scenario 3. With regulation, with bargaining
Service price (in thousands) 4.29 4.27 4.23
Premium (in thousands) 3.76 3.74 3.7
Demand (in thousands) 16.33 16.4 16.56
Premium revenue (in millions) 61.33 61.3 61.3
Medical loss (in millions) 49.07 49.04 49.04
Scenario 4. No regulation, with bargaining & public option
Service price (in thousands) 2.57 2.56 2.59
Premium (in thousands) 2.54 2.54 2.27
Demand (in thousands) 16.55 16.49 20.21
Premium revenue (in millions) 42.05 41.85 45.82
Medical loss (in millions) 29.78 29.58 36.66
Notes: This table characterizes the market in four scenarios. In the first scenario, there is no
regulation and insurers and providers negotiate the service price. In the second scenario, service
prices are fixed at the pre-regulation level and the regulation is effective. The settings of the
third scenario is the same as in the ACA health exchange marketplaces. In the last scenario,
the third insurance plan is a public option and regulated by the medical loss ratio regulation,
while the other two private plans are not regulated.
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Chapter 1 Appendices
A Conditions for 0 < 1−λ
1−λR̄ < 1
In this section, I prove that 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < 1−λ
1−λR̄ < 1 are equivalent.
By definition, 0 < R̄ < 1 and the Lagrangian multiplier λ > 0 when the constraint
is binding. Therefore,
0 < λ < 1 ⇔ 0 < 1− λ < 1− λR̄.
It is not hard to prove that
0 < 1− λ < 1− λR̄ ⇒ 0 < 1− λ
1− λR̄
< 1.




< 1 ⇒ 0 < 1− λ < 1− λR̄ or 0 > 1− λ > 1− λR̄
Because 0 > 1− λ > 1− λR̄ ⇒ λ < λR̄, which contradict to 0 < R̄ < 1 and λ > 0.




< 1 ⇒ 0 < 1− λ < 1− λR̄.




When an insurer providers more than one products, she could strategically select
premiums to maximize the overall profit. In such case, the Nash product function for
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a insurer providing J plans could be written as
fNash = τ ln
[∑
j













































Similar to the single-product case, I apply the envelope theorem and use the


















































Rearrange the denominator of the first term to
[(1− λR̄)φ− (1− λ)pκ]TD
Rearrange the equation (1.4),
(1− λ)pκ− (1− λR̄)φ = (1− λR̄)J−1D
















































= −(1− τ) (16)
where 1 is a J × 1 vector of ones.
Calculation of φ′




• Single product case
Starting from the equation (1.4), in the single-product case,
(1− λ)pκ = (1− λR̄)(φ+ D
D′
)
Then, the total derivative w.r.t. p when φ = φ(p) yields














When each insurers provide more than one plans, φ′ could be derived as following.
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where Jj: is the j
th row of the Jacobian matrix of demand function, Hj is the Hessian











Plug in the matrix form of equation (1.4),
1− λ
1− λR̄




























= − 1− λ
1− λR̄
Jj:κ, ∀j








= − 1− λ
1− λR̄
Jκ
Calculation of derivatives of demand
The next step is to get D′′ from demand estimation. Based on the market share
function specified by equation(1.2), the demand of insurance plan j is








































2(α + παdαi + σ
αναi )
2sijsiksilϕ(νi)dνi
The above terms could be approximated numerically by simulation, as in the
demand estimation. That is changing integral to summation–sum up all the simulated
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(α + παdαi + σ
αναi )
2sijsiksil (22)
By plugging equation(18) to (22) into the equation (17), I obtain ∂φ
∂p
as functions
of λ–a parameter to estimate.
In the demand estimation, because I use log of premium instead of premium, I
need to divide the derivatives by the premium when I implement this approximation.
Elimination of p
From previous section, we know that insurers choose premiums to maximize their





Following the Kuhn-Tucker condition, λ > 0 for insurers triggered the rebate and
λ = 0 otherwise.













= − 1− λ
1− λR̄
Jκ














= − 1− λ
1− λR̄
A−1Jκ (24)
From the bargaining model, the service price p is selected according to the equa-





(1− λR̄)[J−1D]TD + CF
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Then plug the equation(23) into the equation
τ(1− λR̄)(φ+ J−1D)TD
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(1− λR̄)[J−1D]TD + CF
− τ(1− λ)p
MCDκTD










C Conditions for increasing best response function φ(p)
In this section, I am going to discuss the conditions for φ(p) being increasing in p.
D Optimal price in different scenarios
Price-taker insurers
In this scenario, health care providers set the price and insurers are simply price-
takers. Therefore, the price p is set by
max
p
ΠH = (p− ch)θD
The F.O.C. w.r.t. p is
∂ΠH
∂p
= θD + (p− ch)θD′φ′ = 0
Then the optimal price is





This time, health care providers and insurers bargaining over price in a context with-




fNash = τ ln[(φ− pκθ)D − CF ] + (1− τ)ln[(p− ch)θD].
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(φ′ − κθ)D + (φ− pκθ)D′φ′
(φ− pκθ)D − CF
+ (1− τ)θD + (p− ch)θD
′φ′
(p− ch)θD





(φ− pκθ)D − CF









































Therefore, the optimal price in this scenario is























Compare to p∗, the second term in the denominator is the extra term and its
impact on p∗∗ depends on the bargaining power. When τ = 0–insurers have no power













where ηφ = −D
′φ
D
. Then the sign of this red term depends only on the tradeoff
between premium elasticity and the fraction of fixed cost over premium revenue.
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Bargaining with MLR regulation
This is the scenario in the main text, to make things more comparable, I rearrange
the equation (1.6) and get





































Again the second term in the denominator will equal to zero if insurers do not
have any bargaining power. Moreover, when the constraint is not binding, i.e. λ = 0,
then the term will degenerate to the one in the previous subsection.
The table below summarizes the optimal prices in all six possible scenarios.
Optimal price
@ regulation ∃ regulation
Price-maker (τ = 1) p1 = ch p2 = ch
Price-taker (τ = 0) p3 = ch − DD′φ′ p4 = ch −
D
D′φ′






















E Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A1: Effect of MLR regulation on marginal cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
λ 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.0413*** 0.0298*** 0.0288**
(0.00878) (0.00900) (0.00895) (0.00898) (0.00886)
ln(deductible) 0.00851 0.00715 0.00454 0.00884* 0.00968*
(0.00473) (0.00477) (0.00449) (0.00441) (0.00442)
Copayment -0.000594 -0.00117 -0.00237*** -0.00179**
(0.000601) (0.000603) (0.000552) (0.000549)
Coinsurance rate -0.0482 -0.0908 0.136* 0.128*
(0.0644) (0.0624) (0.0627) (0.0616)
Having copayment -0.0174 -0.0151 0.0389* 0.0184
(0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0191) (0.0190)
Having coinsurance 0.0770*** 0.0676*** -0.0223 0.0142
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0178)
ln(OOP max) 0.0453*
(0.0219)
Constant 7.257*** 7.344*** 7.479*** 7.446*** 7.036***
(0.0516) (0.0538) (0.0845) (0.0755) (0.206)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
N 10859 10859 10859 10859 10859
R2 0.022 0.035 0.278 0.302 0.300
Notes: The compliance status is identified by the credibility-adjusted MLR.
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Figure A1: Distribution of Medical Loss Ratio in the Marketplace,
by year
Notes: This figure shows the Kernel density of MLR of insurers in the Marketplace from 2014-
2017. The unit of observation is insurer-year.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Organizational Boundaries
on Healthcare Coordination and
Utilization
with Leila Agha and Keith Marzilli Ericson
2.1 Introduction
Transaction costs and imperfect information can make it difficult to coordinate pro-
duction across firm boundaries (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). The determinants of
firm boundaries have been the subject of substantial theoretical and empirical inves-
tigation, particularly in the literature on vertical integration (Lafontaine and Slade,
2007). Yet, we know less about how firm boundaries affect the firm performance
(Mullainathan and Scharfstein, 2001). and empirical studies from different industries
find mixed results.1
In healthcare, the challenges of cross-firm coordination are particularly salient;
patient care is often produced with the input of many healthcare providers working
in separate organizations. Geographically and over time, there is substantial variation
in the organizational structures those providers operate in. An increasing fraction of
US physicians is employed by large practices or hospitals (Welch et al., 2013), which
may mitigate these coordination challenges. Integrated care organizations such as the
Mayo Clinic, Intermountain Healthcare, and Kaiser Permanente are often held up as
1For example, see Seru (2014); Pierce (2012); Stroebel (2016); Forbes and Lederman (2010);
Forman and Gron (2011).
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models of clinical efficiency and coordinated care (Enthoven, 2009). Yet empirical
evidence on how organizational boundaries affect healthcare productivity is limited.
In this paper, we investigate how organizational boundaries affect healthcare uti-
lization. Existing evidence has shown that when coordination of care is more difficult,
healthcare utilization tends to be higher. These coordination challenges can emerge
when healthcare for an individual patient is spread across many individual providers
(Agha, Frandsen and Rebitzer, 2019; Frandsen et al., 2015), or when provider teams
have fewer repeat interactions (Agha et al., 2018; Kim, Song and Valentine, 2020;
Chen, 2020). Cebul et al. (2008) argue that fragmentation across organizations may
also be an important source of healthcare inefficiency. Organizational boundaries can
affect the coordination costs; e.g., healthcare firms often restrict information trans-
mission to external providers by limiting transfer across electronic medical record
systems. Providers may invest in firm-specific relationships and infrastructure that
improve productivity (Huckman and Pisano, 2006). Finally, organizational fragmen-
tation can affect incentives for clinical process improvement and other efficiency-
enhancing investments due to common agency problems and spillovers that prevent
firms from reaping the full benefit of their investments (Frandsen, Powell and Reb-
itzer, 2019).
We introduce the concept of “organizational concentration,” which measures the
distribution of a patient’s outpatient visits across organizations. A patient’s health-
care has maximal organizational concentration if all of their outpatient care is billed
by the same organization. This construct builds on earlier work studying provider
concentration (Pollack et al., 2016; Agha, Frandsen and Rebitzer, 2019). Organi-
zational concentration describes the realized experience of a given patient, and so is
distinct from market concentration measures used in antitrust research, which instead
measure provider market power for pricing. Patients who receive all their healthcare
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from one firm will have high organizational concentration even if there are many firms
in the market. Conversely, a patient may have low organizational concentration in a
highly concentrated market if they receive healthcare from many different specialty
practices, even if each practice has a monopoly in that specialty.
To our knowledge, we are the first paper to measure organizational concentration
systematically, so we begin with a detailed descriptive analysis. Using a 20% sample
of insurance claims for Medicare fee-for-service enrollees from 2007-2016, we construct
a measure of each patient’s experienced organizational concentration. There is sub-
stantial heterogeneity across regions in organizational concentration, even conditional
on the spread of patient care across providers. Studying patients who move across
regions, we find that moving to a location with a higher level of organizational con-
centration is associated with lower healthcare utilization. While these results suggest
that organizational concentration leads to lower healthcare spending, they should be
interpreted with caution because other attributes of regional practice style and place
effects may be correlated with the level of organizational concentration.
To isolate variation in organizational concentration from other aspects of the local
practice environment, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in patient assignment
to physicians generated by physician exits. We examine the experiences of patients
whose primary care provider (PCP) exits the local market, either due to a move
or retirement, following recent work by Fadlon and Van Parys (2020) and Kwok
(2019). Since patients may endogenously sort to new PCPs on the basis of changes
in their health status, we use an instrumental variable strategy that leverages mean
reversion to predict the change in a patient’s assigned PCP’s average organizational
concentration, adapting the approach used by Laird and Nielsen (2017) and Abaluck
et al. (2020). When PCPs with low organizational concentration exit the market,
their patients switch to more typical PCPs with higher average concentration and
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subsequently experience lower healthcare utilization. Using this variation, we estimate
that patients who switch to a PCP with 1 SD higher organizational concentration have
10% lower healthcare utilization in our preferred, most controlled specification. This
finding is robust to controlling for the number and types of providers that the patient
visits.
Our results indicate that organizational boundaries contribute additional frictions
that lower the efficiency of healthcare provision, and this pattern does not simply
reflect the challenges of spreading care across multiple providers. Although we can-
not fully isolate a PCP’s tendency for organizational concentration from every other
possible dimension of PCP practice style, our estimated effect remains large in spec-
ifications that control for the spread of patient care across providers, the size of the
PCP’s practice group, as well as other PCP characteristics (residency training, ex-
perience, gender). To the extent that observable variables are informative about
selection on unobservables, this supports the claim that organizational concentration
is an important independent contributor to spending variation (Oster, 2019).
Finally, we investigate how organizational concentration influences quality of care.
We use several measures related to distinct dimensions of healthcare quality, spanning
gaps in primary care, appropriate management of chronic conditions, and repeated
testing. We find no strong evidence that changes in PCP organizational concentration
predict changes in inpatient or emergency department visits, or labs. However, for
patients with a chronic condition (diabetes), switching to a PCP with higher levels of
organizational concentration leads to better adherence to recommended care guide-
lines. This finding from diabetes care provides suggestive evidence that greater orga-
nizational concentration may facilitate improved management of chronic conditions.
We also find suggestive evidence that spending higher organizational concentration
reduces claims for diagnostic imaging.
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High levels of organizational concentration arise when most of the providers a
patient consults are integrated within the same firm. Our research is motivated
by earlier work finding the effects of firm integration on productive efficiency are
theoretically ambiguous. Bringing transactions into the same firm could improve
communication (Arrow, 1975) and reduce contracting barriers (Hart and Moore, 1990;
Hart and Holmstrom, 2010). On the other hand, integration may also lead resources
within the firm to be allocated less efficiently (Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008;
Friebel and Raith, 2010). Moreover, integration may improve coordination in stable
environments but lead to worse adaptation to change (Dessein, 2014).
Empirical evidence from other industries on how integration affects firm perfor-
mance has found mixed results. Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001), Seru (2014),
and Pierce (2012) document downsides to integration including less efficient capac-
ity management, lower innovation, and insufficient knowledge sharing. By contrast,
Stroebel (2016), Forbes and Lederman (2010), Forman and Gron (2011) find bene-
fits of firm integration including superior information, better performance, and faster
technology adoption. Atalay, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2014) argue that integration
facilitates the efficient intrafirm transfer of intangible inputs, such as high quality
managerial oversight and planning. We build on this literature by studying how
firm boundaries affect health care delivery, a setting where the potential benefits
of improved coordination, knowledge-sharing, and management are high, and rich
insurance claims data allows us to track the production process.
Within healthcare, there is limited evidence on how the integration of healthcare
providers affects care delivery. Although large consolidated practice groups argue
they can deliver lower cost, higher quality healthcare through improved coordination,
leveraging returns to specialization, and facilitating fixed cost investments, empirical
evidence of these benefits is limited (Cutler and Scott Morton, 2013). Recent work
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suggests that hospital mergers and acquisitions of physician practices do not spur
improvements in clinical quality or health outcomes (Beaulieu et al., 2020; Koch,
Wendling and Wilson, 2018).2 We build on this research by studying changes in
the extent to which individual patient care crosses firm boundaries, rather than fo-
cusing on short-run effects of mergers and acquisitions. Care coordination depends
on the ease of communication across multiple providers who treat the same patient,
but mergers may simply bring competing providers—who rarely would have treated
the same patient—into the same firm. Further, the process of organizational trans-
formation is often slow. Because this paper does not focus on short-run effects of
mergers, the effects we study may reflect longer-run operational changes associated
with integration.
This paper is also related to a growing literature investigating differences in prac-
tice patterns across individual physicians. Across a variety of care contexts, individual
physician quality and practice style have important effects on care outcomes.3 Recent
work by Kwok (2019) and Fadlon and Van Parys (2020) documents that primary care
physicians in particular have substantial influence on patients’ healthcare spending.
We build on this insight by investigating one important dimension of PCP practice
environment and referral patterns, i.e. the PCP’s tendency to concentrate patient
care within organizations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces our measure of organiza-
tional concentration. Section 2.3 describes our data and sample selection. Section 2.4
reports descriptive statistics on regional variation in organizational concentration and
uses movers between regions to explore how regional variation in organizational con-
2These acquisitions may even raise healthcare spending, as physicians shift the site of care from
doctors’ offices to hospital outpatient settings (Koch, Wendling and Wilson, 2017) and exploit re-
imbursement rules that allow hospital-owned physician practices to charge additional facility fees
(Capps, Dranove and Ody, 2018).
3For example, see Gowrisankaran, Joiner and Léger (2017); Molitor (2018); Chan, Gentzkow and
Yu (2019); Currie and MacLeod (2017); Currie, MacLeod and Van Parys (2016); Sahni et al. (2016).
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centration may contribute to regional variation in healthcare utilization. Section 2.5
lays out our main empirical strategy exploiting PCP exits to explore the impact
of organizational concentration. Section 2.6 presents the results on how healthcare
utilization and quality outcomes change when a patient switches to a PCP with a
different level of organizational concentration. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Defining Organizational Concentration
In this project, we study the coordination frictions that arise when healthcare is spread
across organizational boundaries. To do so, we define organizational concentration,
adapting a concentration index that has been used in prior literature to measure the
spread of patient care across providers.4 Specifically, we use a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) that calculates how outpatient healthcare received by a patient is spread
across organizations. We measure organizational concentration using outpatient care,
following previous literature defining continuity of outpatient care across individual
physicians (Nyweide and Bynum, 2017; Nyweide et al., 2013). This allows us to
consider the impact of outpatient organizational concentration on the likelihood that
a patient requires an emergency department visit or hospitalization.
We calculate patient i’s share of outpatient visits at each organization j, in a year






In general, organizational concentration is higher when a patient visits fewer orga-
nizations. When a patient’s outpatient visits are uniformly distributed across N
organizations, this measure is simply 1/N . When a patient receives all the visits
4Pollack et al. (2016) provides an overview and comparison of commonly used measures of care
continuity.
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from one organization, this concentration measure will be 1. Lower values correspond
to patient care that is spread more diffusely across organizations.
For some analyses, we aggregate organizational concentration up to at the hos-
pital referral region (HRR) level. In our primary empirical strategy, we aggregate
organizational concentration up to the PCP level.
Defining provider concentration
To distinguish our findings from prior analyses, we study variation in organizational
concentration conditional on provider concentration: the spread of patient healthcare
across providers. Following Agha, Frandsen and Rebitzer (2019), we construct a
measure of provider care concentration where the shareipt measures the share of





This measure will capture the challenges of coordinating healthcare across many
providers, thus allowing us to distinguish them from the frictions that are specific
to crossing organizational boundaries.
2.3 Data and Sample Construction
2.3.1 Patient sample selection
Our primary source of data is a 20% sample of Medicare Fee-For-Service (FFS) Part A
and Part B claims data from 2007-2016. The 10-year panel data allows us to observe
both patient moves and PCP exits. We use the Carrier, Inpatient, and Outpatient
claims files to measure care utilization and spending.5 Patient demographics (age, sex,
5The Inpatient file contains institutional inpatient claims, and the Outpatient file contains claims
from institutional outpatient providers such as hospital outpatient departments or community mental
health centers. The Carrier file contains non-institutional claims billed by individual providers such
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zip code) and chronic conditions are extracted from the Master Beneficiary Summary
file with the Chronic Condition segment. In the remainder of this section, we describe
the sample restrictions implemented to construct our main analytic samples.
Initial sample restrictions
We restrict our sample to Medicare beneficiaries who are 66–99 years old (inclusive)
and continuously enrolled in Medicare FFS. After these restrictions, our data covers
9,356,144 beneficiaries. Our organizational concentration measure is defined based on
outpatient site of care visits billed in the Carrier claims files, so we drop 223,822 ben-
eficiaries who did not have any visits of this type. This comprises our Broad Sample.
From this broad sample, we define two separate analytic samples for different pur-
poses. First, we define a “Patient Mover Sample” for a descriptive analysis studying
regional variation in organizational concentration. Second, we define a “PCP Exit
Sample” for our primary analysis studying the relationship between PCPs’ organiza-
tional concentration and patient care utilization. We describe each of these samples
below.
Patient Mover Sample
We construct a Patient Mover Sample for our initial descriptive analysis. Sample
restrictions defined here follow the construction process outlined in Agha, Frandsen
and Rebitzer (2019). We assigned each patient to a hospital referral region (HRR) on
an annual basis, using the zip code reported in the Beneficiary Summary File. Further,
we require that the patient received at least 75% of billed claims within that HRR;
we drop beneficiaries who do not meet this requirement. To be included as a mover,
the patient’s HRR must have changed once (and only once) in our 10-year period.
Further, the beneficiary must be continuously in the sample from two years before
as physicians, and these claims can result from services provided at either outpatient or inpatient
settings.
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their move to two years after. Our sample includes all moving patients who meet these
criteria as well as a 25% random sample of non-movers (whose HRR never changed
during this time period); non-movers contribute toward covariate identification. The
final Patient Mover Sample includes 25,592 mover beneficiaries and 1,364,198 non-
mover beneficiaries.
PCP Exit Sample
Next, we construct our PCP Exit Sample for our main analysis. This analysis fo-
cuses on beneficiaries who change their attributed PCP due to the original PCP’s
relocation or retirement. We use provider taxonomies to distinguish primary care
specialties from other types of providers. The provider taxonomy codes used for this
categorization are reported in Table A1 and include codes for internal medicine, fam-
ily medicine, pediatrics, geriatrics, and general practice. Provider taxonomy codes are
the primary specialty code from the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System
(NPPES), which is linked to our sample by providers’ National Provider Identifier
(NPI). We attribute each patient to their plurality PCP in each year, defined as the
provider who bills a plurality of the patient’s Evaluation & Management (E&M) visits
that year; ties are broken randomly. We exclude patients who have no E&M visits
and thus cannot be matched to a provider, as well as patients whose plurality provider
does not report a primary care specialty. If a patient cannot be matched to a PCP
according to this algorithm, they will be excluded from the PCP Exit Sample.
We limit this analysis to patients whose initial attributed PCP either moved (i.e.
relocated once to a different HRR) or retired (i.e. bills no further Medicare claims).
We also exclude patients who move across HRRs themselves or who have ever changed
their PCP in our sample period prior to the exit of their assigned original PCPs. The
PCP Exit Sample includes 62,924 beneficiaries and 335,868 beneficiary-year obser-
vations. These patients are initially attributed to one of 4365 relocating PCPs or
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11,437 retiring PCPs; including both the exiting PCPs and the destination PCPs,
this sample covers 52,981 PCPs.
2.3.2 Measuring organizational concentration
Measuring Organizations
The next step is to construct our measure of organizational concentration. We begin
by identifying provider organizations delivering outpatient care to each patient. We
limit to provider services billed in the Carrier claims file and provided in an outpatient
setting. The outpatient setting is identified using the place of service code listed on
the Carrier file claims; a complete list of places of service codes is in Appendix Table
A2. We then define a visit by aggregating claims to a unique provider-date pair.
About 85% of visits measured in the Carrier claim file are classified as outpatient
visits.
We use the federal tax ID numbers (TINs) associated with each Carrier file claim
to identify provider organizations. Our sample covers 447,009 TINs. TINs provide a
measure of financial organization, with integrated physician practices typically billing
under a unique TIN, although some large provider groups may organize themselves
into subsidiaries, billing under separate TINs (Baker, Bundorf and Royalty, 2016). In
these cases, TINs may still delineate organizational boundaries within the firm, even
though they are not a perfect measure of firm boundaries.
We calculate organizational concentration at the patient-year level following the
definition in equation 2.1 and the descriptions in Section 2.2. To construct these
regional and shrunk PCP-level averages, we include our full initial sample of Medicare
beneficiaries before implementing any of the specialized restrictions for the Mover or
PCP Exit analysis samples.
We find that our baseline TIN-based measure of organizational concentration is
highly correlated with an alternative definition based on physicians’ reported organi-
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zational ties in the CMS Physician Compare database. Physician Compare data is
only available for the final three years of our sample (2014-2016), so we cannot use it
as our baseline analysis which tracks organizational concentration over a longer time
period. In years where both measures are available, we use the affiliations reported
in Physician Compare to construct an alternative measure of organizational ties, and
compare this to our baseline TIN-based definition. The organizational concentration
measures are correlated at 0.95 when averaged at the HRR level, and are correlated
at 0.85 when averaged at the PCP level (prior to any shrinkage).
Earlier work by Baker et al. (2014), Austin and Baker (2015) and Baker, Bun-
dorf and Kessler (2020a) has also used TINs to measure local competition across
physician provider groups. This research has shown that areas with higher market
concentration pay higher prices for physician services. While this prior work suggests
that providers sharing the same TINs are able to leverage oligopoly power in areas
with high market concentration, our paper will test whether TIN-based measures of
business organization are predictive of clinical integration that may yield offsetting
benefits for patients and payers.
Aggregating organizational concentration to the HRR-level and PCP-levels
To characterize the pattern of organizational concentration at the hospital referral
region (HRR) level we average the patient-level measures across all patients within
the relevant region.
Our primary empirical strategy exploits variation in PCPs’ tendencies towards
organizational concentration. The average patient in our sample is seen by a PCP
who has 35 other attributed patients in the same year. To account for statistical
noise in PCP organizational concentration, we apply a conventional empirical Bayes
correction (Morris, 1983). This correction shrinks the estimated PCP concentration
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towards the year-specific mean, in proportion to the amount of estimation error.6
To investigate the degree of shrinkage, we calculate “pseudo shrinkage coefficients”
for organizational concentration, defined as each physician’s demeaned Bayesian pos-
terior divided by the demeaned raw (not shrunk) estimate. A coefficient of one implies
no shrinkage. The median coefficient is 0.89, with the 10th percentile at 0.63 and the
90th percentile at 0.99. This distribution suggests modest shrinkage, consistent with
the high correlation (0.97) between the raw and shrunk measures.
For regression analyses at the HRR and PCP level, we exclusively rely on jack-
knifed versions of these organizational concentration measures that omit the index
patient to avoid bias driven by an individual patient’s need for more specialized care.
Paralleling the procedure for organizational concentration, we calculate regional
and provider level measures of provider concentration to include as a control in some
regressions. This measure is also jackknifed, and the PCP level provider concentration
is also shrunk with an empirical Bayes procedure.
2.3.3 Outcome measures
Our primary outcome variable is a patient’s annual healthcare utilization, which
aggregates a patient’s spending across the Medicare Inpatient, Outpatient and Carrier
claim files. Utilization measures are constructed using a fixed set of annual Medicare
prices expunged of regional price adjusters.7
We also study the relationship between organizational concentration and several
utilization-based measures of healthcare quality. We study two measures related to
6To implement the empirical Bayes correction, we estimate a random effects model where patient-
level organizational concentration depends on year fixed effects and PCP-year random effects. To
achieve jackknifing, we omit the index patient from this regression. We recover empirical Bayes
estimates of PCP-year organizational concentration as the sum of the year fixed effect and the best
linear unbiased predictor of the PCP-year random effect.
7Medicare prices include some regional adjustments on the basis of local wage indices, and we
do not want this source of regional variation in wage indices to confound the relationship between
organizational concentration and spending. Following Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams (2016),
we adjust total spending to strip away variation that is due to regional price adjustments.
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the use of hospital care: a binary indicator for any inpatient hospitalization, and
a binary indicator for any emergency department (ED) visit. Following Venkatesh
et al. (2017), we define ED visits as any Carrier claim with a HCPCS code for E&M
care in an ED setting. One potential cost of poorly coordinated care is additional
low-value or duplicative imaging tests. We define an imaging test as repeated if it
follows a prior test on the same body part with the same imaging modality within 30
days. Lastly, we examine the effects of organizational concentration on the indicators
of healthcare quality for patients with diabetes: HbA1c test, and LDL test. These
outcomes are only defined for the sub-sample of patients with diabetes, as defined by
the Chronic Condition Warehouse; tests are identified with HCPCS codes.
2.4 Descriptive Evidence on Organizational Concentration
2.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the Broad Sample (column 1), the Patient
Mover Sample (column 2), and the PCP Exit Sample (column 3). Summary statistics
suggest these samples are broadly similar. The average level of organizational con-
centration is 0.45, demonstrating that most patients regularly seek outpatient care
across multiple organizations. The average level of provider concentration is lower
than average organizational concentration at 0.38, as expected given that patients will
often see multiple providers within the same organization. Average care utilization
is $8641 per year; utilization is lower in the PCP exit sample, perhaps in part due to
the disruptive impact of PCP exits.
Appendix Table A3 further reports the mean and standard deviation of the
patient-level, PCP level, and HRR level measures of organizational concentration,
provider concentration, and total utilization. We use the standard deviations reported
here to interpret the scale of our regression results. The empirical Bayes procedure
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recovers an estimate of the true standard deviation of organizational concentration
across PCPs; as expected the adjusted standard deviation of 0.13 is slightly lower
than that of the raw means (0.16).
Large variation between regions in healthcare usage suggests that some regions
may be inefficient (Skinner, 2011), and prior research has sought to explain why this
variation exists (e.g. Cutler et al. (2019); Molitor (2018); Frakes (2013); Finkelstein,
Gentzkow and Williams (2016)). We examine how organizational concentration varies
across regions in Figure 2·1. This map displays residual variation in organizational
concentration across regions, after accounting for the role of provider concentration,
age, sex, and race. As shown in the map, the West and Upper Midwest have higher
organizational concentration than would be predicted by their provider concentra-
tion and demographics, while the South and Mid Atlantic have lower organizational
concentration.
Figure 2·2 shows binned scatter plots relating organizational concentration and
total healthcare spending. In Panel A, the observation is the regional (HRR) average,
while in Panel B, the observation is the average of patients attributed to the same
PCP. Panel A illustrates that regions with higher organizational concentration have
lower levels of care utilization on average; we will investigate this relationship in more
detail with our analysis of patients who move across regions, while Panel B shows
that patients of PCPs with higher organizational concentration have lower levels of
healthcare utilization. These patterns motivate our study of PCP exits in Section 2.5.
The patterns uncovered in these descriptive graphs motivate our analytic ap-
proach. First, they suggest a link between organizational concentration and care
utilization, which we will investigate for the remainder of this paper. Second, it will
be important to separate organizational concentration from variation in provider con-
centration; we focus on residual variation in organizational concentration conditional
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on provider concentration. Finally, given the possible endogenous link between pa-
tient health status and organizational concentration, we focus on econometric strate-
gies which allow us to plausibly isolate the supply-side variation in organizational
concentration from variation in patient demand for care.
2.4.2 Regional variation in organizational concentration and patient moves
Previous work has examined patients who move between regions to identify the effect
of regional practice variation on spending (Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams, 2016;
Agha, Frandsen and Rebitzer, 2019). Here, we use the same mover design to examine
how regional organizational concentration correlates with the care received by moving
patients. When moving between regions, patients are exposed to a change in the
local pattern of organizational concentration. We provide descriptive evidence on the
possible role of organizational concentration in shaping regional differences in care.
Following prior work, we run regressions of the form:
Yit = δ1∆OrgConcregion(i) × postit + δ2∆ProviderConcregion(i) × postit
+x′itβ + αi + γt + τ(i,t) + εit (2.3)
where Yit is the outcome of interest, ∆OrgConcregion(i) is the change in regional organi-
zational concentration experienced when patient i moves, and ∆ProviderConcregion(i)
is the change in regional provider concentration experienced when the patient moves.
We also include: xit, a vector of age fixed effects (in 5 year bins); αi, an individ-
ual fixed effect; γt, a year fixed effect; and τ(i,t), a vector of event-time fixed effects
indicating the year relative to the patient move.
Figure 2·3 presents event study graphs and shows that when patients move to a
region with higher average organizational concentration, they experience an immedi-
ate and persistent increase in their individual organizational concentration. Table 2.2
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reports the regression results, summarizing how changes in regional average organiza-
tional concentration translate into individual patients’ experiences when they move.
If all regional variation were due to differences in the types of patients that lived in
each region, then we would expect zero pass-through, while if movers fully adopted
the average patterns of care in each region they lived, we would expect 100% pass-
through. The regression in column 1 shows that about 80% of the regional difference
in organizational concentration translates into patient-level changes in organizational
concentration.
The final columns of Table 2.2 show how moving to a region with a different
level of average organizational concentration is associated with changes in total care
utilization. Column 2 shows that moving to a region with 1 standard deviation
(SD) greater regional organizational concentration (an increase of 0.05) is associated
with a 4.6% decline in total utilization. However, we know that changes in regional
organizational concentration are also correlated with changes in regional provider
concentration. Column 3 adds a control for the region’s provider concentration, and
finds that the relationship between organizational concentration and total utilization
diminishes only slightly: a 1 SD increase in regional organizational concentration
is associated with a 3.7% decline in total utilization. These results suggest that
the spread of patient care across distinct organizations is an important predictor of
regional variation in health care utilization.
2.5 Identification Strategy: PCP Exits
In the previous section, we described how regional variation in organizational con-
centration predicts spending outcomes. The hurdle for interpreting these findings is
that regional organizational concentration may also be correlated with other features
of the local healthcare environment. To address this concern, we turn to our study of
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PCP exits. When a PCP exits a local market, due to a retirement or long-distance
move, that PCP’s patients must find new care providers within their local market.
This natural experiment allows us to study exogenous variation in PCP practice style
holding constant many features of the local healthcare market.
Organizational concentration may depend on a patient’s PCP for a few reasons.
First, PCPs may deliberately choose to refer preferentially to other providers within
a multispecialty practice. In addition, PCPs themselves may be affiliated with a
large organization that is tied to many local specialists, increasing the organizational
concentration that would occur even without preferential referrals. We characterize
each PCP’s practice pattern with their average organizational concentration. We
then test what happens to patient-level organizational concentration and healthcare
utilization when a PCP exit forces the patient to switch to a new PCP with a different
level of organizational concentration.
Our study of PCP exits thus analyzes how changes in the organizational concen-
tration of a patient’s assigned PCP affects the patient’s outcomes. Because we observe
patients who switch PCPs, we can include patient fixed effects in our regression model
to control for any fixed patient attributes that influence their healthcare utilization.
However, patients may endogenously sort to new PCPs on the basis of changes in their
demand for care. For instance, patients who have gotten sicker may deliberately seek
out multispecialty practices or well-known health systems when their original PCP
exits. This type of sorting would bias our estimation of how organizational concen-
tration affects healthcare spending within a difference-in-differences framework, since
patient fixed effects would not adequately capture changes over time. As a result,
we focus our analysis on an instrumental variables strategy adapted from Laird and
Nielsen (2017) and Abaluck et al. (2020).
Our instrumental variables (IV) approach exploits the statistical property of mean
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reversion to predict the change in the organizational concentration of a patient’s as-
signed PCP after their original PCP exits. Patients whose initial PCP was highly
concentrated will on average experience a decrease in their PCP’s organizational
concentration when they switch providers. Patients whose initial PCP had low con-
centration will on average experience an increase in their PCP’s organizational con-
centration.
The exclusion restriction for this identification strategy requires that changes in
patient demand for care are not endogenously related to the level of organizational
concentration of the original PCP. While we cannot test this assumption directly, we
investigate event-study graphs to assess whether patients with different original PCP
organizational concentration are on differential trends prior to that PCP’s exit. The
monotonicity assumption for this strategy requires that having an original PCP with
high organizational concentration can only increase the probability that the patient
experiences a decline in the PCP organizational concentration after the original PCP
exits. This should hold when patients use a similar approach to selecting their sec-
ond PCP as they applied when searching for the original PCP. We discuss these IV
assumptions in more detail in the next section.
2.5.1 Estimating equations
To fix ideas, we consider first a simple difference-in-difference regression, noting that
the change in PCP organizational concentration is potentially endogenous. We then
lay out our IV regression equations. Letting i index patients, t index calendar years,
and τ index years relative to the exit of a patient’s PCP, the difference-in-difference
equation we estimate is:
Yit = δ1∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit + x′itβ + αi + γt + τ(i,t) + εit (2.4)
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where Yit denotes a patient-level, time-varying outcome; in our baseline specifications,
we consider two outcomes, the patient’s total healthcare utilization and the patient’s
experienced organizational concentration. We define ∆OrgConcPCP (i) as the differ-
ence between the destination PCP’s organizational concentration in the year after the
move minus the origin PCP’s organizational concentration in the year before the move
: ∆OrgConcPCP (i) = OrgConcdestinationPCP (i,τ+1)−OrgConcoriginPCP (i,τ−1). The new
PCP is defined as the patient’s plurality provider in the year following his original
PCP’s exit. This is interacted with the indicator variable, postit, equal to 1 in periods
after a patient’s original PCP has exited, and zero otherwise. As a result, the coeffi-
cient δ1 identifies how changes in care utilization before and after PCP exit relate to
changes in PCP organizational concentration practice style. 8
The regression controls for individual patient fixed effects αi and year fixed effects
γt, as well a time-varying patient characteristic (age) in x
′
it. The regression also
includes a vector of event time fixed effects τ(i,t) indicating the year relative to the
PCP exit event; these controls will account for any differential trends or disruption in
care when PCPs exit that are experienced uniformly by all patients whose physician
exits, regardless of the exiting physician’s specific practice style.
The challenge to interpreting this difference-in-differences regression is that pa-
tients may endogenously sort to new PCPs on the basis of changes in their health
status. To overcome this identification challenge, we do not estimate the difference-in-
differences regression directly, but instead focus on an instrumental variables strategy.
When a patient’s PCP exits the market due to a retirement or long-distance
move, the patient is forced to find a new provider. On average, patients tend to
switch to more typical providers. This pattern implies that a patient’s lagged PCP
exit will predict their care utilization differentially depending on the organizational
8Recall, the PCP’s organizational concentration measures are defined in a jackknifed manner
that omits the index patient from the calculation to avoid mechanical endogeneity.
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concentration of their exiting PCP. This insight underlies our instrumental variables
strategy, which builds on recent work with similar instruments by Abaluck et al.
(2020) and Laird and Nielsen (2017). Our first stage equation uses the initial PCP’s
organizational concentration, denoted OrgConcPCP (i),initial, to predict the change in
organizational concentration when the initial provider exits:
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit = δo1OrgConcPCP (i),initial × postit
+x′itβ







With the fitted values from this first stage equation, we construct a two-stage least
squares estimate of equation 2.4.
Interpreting δ1 from our instrumental variable estimates as the average causal
impact of the PCP’s organizational concentration on individual outcomes requires
several assumptions, which we describe here. Under the assumption of constant
treatment effects, assumptions 1 and 2 below suffice to recover treatment effects
of being treated by a PCP with higher organizational concentration. If there are
heterogeneous treatment effects, then assumptions 3 and 4 are needed to ensure that
we recover average treatment effects.9 Finally, assumption 5 is needed to interpret
PCP organizational concentration (rather than another correlated dimension of PCP
practice style) as the underlying reason for the differences in patient care utilization.
1. First stage: The original PCP’s level of organizational concentration must
predict the patients’ change in PCP organizational concentration after the orig-
inal PCP exits, conditional on included covariates. This assumption is directly
testable; we report first stage F-statistics along with our IV results.
2. Exclusion restriction: This assumption requires parallel trends among pa-
9Assumptions 3 and 4 together are similar to the fallback condition described in Abaluck et al.
(2020).
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tients with different initial exposure to PCP organizational concentration. Specif-
ically, patients who are initially attributed to PCPs with high levels of organiza-
tional concentration must be on the same counterfactual utilization trajectory
as patients whose initial PCP has a lower level of PCP organizational concen-
tration. We assess the plausibility of this assumption with event study graphs.
3. Monotonicity: Having an origin PCP with high organizational concentration
can only increase the probability that the patient experiences a decline in the
PCP organizational concentration after the original PCP exits. This is satisfied
if patients use similar selection strategies to find a replacement PCP as they used
to find their original PCP. For example, this assumption would be violated if
some patients of high organizational concentration PCPs deliberately seek out a
PCP with an even higher concentration due to their experience with the original
PCP.
4. No differential selection on gains: Conditional variation in the original
PCP’s organizational concentration must not predict the degree of selection on
gains in choosing a new provider. The treatment effect of switching PCPs is
independent of the exit timing and the practice styles of the exiting PCP.
5. Organizational concentration selection on observables only: Other fac-
tors that influence a PCP’s effect on patient care utilization must be uncorre-
lated with organizational concentration, after controlling for observed patient
and provider characteristics. Without randomized manipulation of referral pat-
terns, this is a strong assumption, and we discuss it in more detail below. When
this assumption is violated, our estimate can be interpreted as the causal effect
of switching to a higher organizational concentration PCP, rather than isolat-
ing the effect of organizational concentration from other dimensions of practice
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style.
Although the PCP exit strategy approach holds the regional practice environment
fixed, PCP practice style is still multidimensional. A PCP’s organizational concen-
tration may be correlated with other aspects of the PCP’s practice style, which would
violate assumption 5 (selection on observables only) described above. In particular,
physicians who make more referrals, ceding more of their patients’ care to other in-
ternists and specialists, will have more opportunities to reduce the organizational
concentration. Prior research has documented that concentrating patient care within
a narrow set of providers (provider concentration) is associated with lower levels of
utilization (Agha, Frandsen and Rebitzer, 2019; Hussey et al., 2014; Frandsen et al.,
2015).
To establish that the impact of organizational concentration is distinct from the
well-studied phenomenon of provider concentration, our main regression specifica-
tions include both measures. Moreover, we instrument for the change in provider
concentration using an analogous approach to how we instrument for the change in
organizational concentration: with the provider concentration practice style of the ex-
iting PCP. Defining ∆ProviderConcPCP (i) as the difference between the new PCP’s
provider concentration and old PCP’s provider concentration, we estimate a new first
stage for organizational concentration as follows:
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit = δo1OrgConcPCP (i),initial × postit
+δo2ProviderConcPCP (i),initial × postit
+x′itβ







We also estimate a parallel first stage equation for ∆ProviderConcPCP (i). Finally,
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we estimate the second stage equation, instrumenting for both endogenous variables:
Yit = δ1∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit + δ2∆ProviderConcPCP (i) × postit
+x′itβ + αi + γt + τi,t + εit. (2.7)
Further, we test the robustness of our findings to adding controls for PCP char-
acteristics and practice environment. These specifications control for PCP gender,
experience, residency training, and the size of the PCP’s practice organization. Larger
firms may hire higher quality staff, have greater capital investment, or different man-
agerial quality; by controlling for the size of the PCP’s practice organization, we can
separate any general benefits of having a PCP who is employed by a large firm from
the effects of organizational concentration.
2.6 Results
This section uses our instrumental variables strategy to show how PCP organizational
concentration affects healthcare utilization. After discussing our baseline findings, we
consider several alternative specifications, and then explore the relationship between
organizational concentration and care quality.
2.6.1 PCP organizational concentration and utilization
To analyze how care patterns respond when a patient’s PCP exits, we begin by exam-
ining Figure 2·4. These graphs exploit the same variation underlying our instrumental
variables approach, but instead of including a single indicator variable for the post
period, they include a vector of fixed effects for each year relative to the PCP exit
event. The endogenous variables of interest are the interaction of these relative event
time fixed effects with the change in PCP organizational concentration, and the in-
strumental variables are the vector of interactions between these relative event time
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fixed effects and the original PCP’s organizational concentration.
The figure illustrates that when a patient’s PCP exits the local market, the pa-
tient’s care outcomes shift sharply towards the practice style of their new PCP. In
Panel A, we show that if the new provider is predicted to have higher organizational
concentration (so their patients receive care at fewer distinct organizations), the pa-
tient’s experienced organizational concentration also increases. This establishes that
PCP organizational concentration plays an important role in shaping patient-level
organizational concentration, even when the patient remains in the same geographic
location. In Panel B, we show that if the new provider is predicted to have greater
organizational concentration, the patient’s total healthcare utilization declines.
In both panels of this graph, we note an absence of pre-trends prior to the move.
This demonstrates that patients whose original PCPs have different levels of organi-
zational concentration are not on differential trends of care utilization prior to the
original PCP’s exit. This pattern supports the exclusion restriction, described as
assumption 2 above. We also see that in year 1, the first full calendar year after their
PCP has exited, patients have the largest year-over-year change on both experienced
organizational concentration and utilization. The new PCP’s influence may grow over
time, as she gradually shapes the set of referred providers that the patient consults.
In subsequent years 2 through 5, patients’ care evolves to conform more closely to
the practice style of their new PCP.
Our IV regressions in Table 2.3 show that the effects of organizational concen-
tration on utilization that are large and robust to accounting for other dimensions
of PCP practice style, training, and practice setting. We instrument for the change
in organizational concentration with the level of organizational concentration at the
original PCP. The estimated first stage equation in column 5 is strong, and shows
that coming from an origin PCP with a 0.1 higher organizational concentration pre-
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dicts a 0.043 greater decrease in the new PCP’s organizational concentration. The
associated second stage with this specification in Column 1 finds that about 29% of
the variation in PCP organizational concentration practice style translates into the
patient’s individually experienced organizational concentration.
Columns 2-4 contain our main results relating organizational concentration to
spending, while columns 6-8 below each second stage result contain the associated
first stage equation for that set of controls.10 Column 2 shows that a 0.1 instrumented
for increase in organizational concentration leads to an 11% decline in healthcare
utilization. The estimated standard deviation of organizational concentration across
PCPs after applying Bayesian shrinkage is 0.13 (see Appendix Table A3), suggesting
that a 1 SD increase in PCP organizational concentration leads to a 14% decline in
utilization. Column 3 shows that this effect persists and is attenuated only slightly by
the inclusion of provider concentration as an additional endogenous variable. Though
the standard error on the estimate doubles, the relationship between organization
concentration and care utilization remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
This result shows that the frictions that arise when care crosses firm boundaries are
distinct from previously studied concepts of provider concentration.
The main hurdle to interpreting this relationship as the causal effect of orga-
nizational concentration is that PCPs with more concentrated practice styles may
differ along other dimensions besides their organizational concentration. By focus-
ing on PCP exits experienced by patients who are not themselves moving, we are
able to hold constant many features of the local healthcare environment. Neverthe-
less, PCPs’ training, practice environment, and taste for aggressive care may covary
with the PCP’s tendency to concentrate care within an organization. To address this
concern, we introduce controls for PCP gender, residency training, and experience
10Note that columns 5 and 6 share a common first stage since they differ only in the choice of the
dependent variable, so column 6 simply repeats column 5.
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(based on medical school graduation year). Further, we control for the size of the
PCP’s practice organization, as measured by the number of distinct providers billing
to the TIN, as well as the number of claims billed to the TIN. By controlling for the
organization size, we can account for the possibility that physicians working in larger
practice groups have different quality, practice style, or access to capital inputs.
Reassuringly, we find no attenuation of the relationship between the PCP’s organi-
zational concentration and patient utilization once we account for PCP characteristics
and practice size. Our preferred, most controlled specification (Column 4) shows that
a 1 SD increase in PCP organizational concentration is predicted to reduce health
care spending by 10%. The robustness of our findings to these controls provides evi-
dence that our results are driven by differences in organizational ties, and are not an
artifact of different practice settings, physician training, or experience.
2.6.2 Robustness and alternative specifications
Difference in differences results. These findings can be contrasted with the dif-
ference in differences specifications reported in Appendix Table A4. Without the
instrumental variable approach, we estimate a smaller effect of PCP organizational
concentration on care utilization. We believe these results are attenuated due to con-
founding. Patients who find themselves in worsening health are more likely to seek out
care at large, integrated practices that include a wide array of specialists. PCPs affil-
iated with these practices are likely to have higher organizational concentration, but
the patients who endogeneously select them may have increasing demand for health
care services. This comparison highlights the motivation behind the instrumental
variables approach. Specifically, a patient’s choice of new PCP after their original
PCP exits is likely to be endogenous to changes in the patients’ demand for care.
By isolating the variation in PCP organizational concentration that is predictable
due to mean reversion, the IV approach avoids relying on these endogenous selection
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patterns to estimate the impact of organizational concentration.
Exploring the role of PCP provider concentration. Appendix Table A6 pro-
vides more detail on our results, specifically reporting our instrumental variable re-
sults on how PCPs’ provider concentration practice style affects care utilization. In
column 1, we estimate an alternative specification that only includes PCP provider
concentration as an endogenous variable, omitting organizational concentration from
the model. As expected, patients whose PCPs tend to concentrate their patients’
care within a smaller set of providers also have lower spending. This finding corrob-
orates the pattern found in the earlier literature on provider fragmentation (Agha,
Frandsen and Rebitzer, 2019; Frandsen et al., 2015; Austin and Baker, 2015), and
shows that the finding holds under a new identification strategy– our instrumental
variables approach. However, once we add PCP organizational concentration as an
additional endogenous variable in our IV framework, the estimated effect of provider
concentration attenuates and becomes statistically insignificant, as seen in columns 2
and 3. These results suggest that some of the spending previously attributed to the
spread of care across providers may have actually reflected the challenges of coordi-
nation across organizations. Accounting for the role of organizational coordination
diminishes the role of provider concentration.
Accounting for patient demand for specialized care. Appendix Table A5 es-
tablishes that the relationship we uncover is also robust to including detailed controls
for the number and type of providers the patient consults. Specifically, we extend
our instrumental variables specification to include additional controls for the number
of generalist providers the patient sees, as well as the number of specialist providers
the patient sees. The estimated effect of organizational concentration remains large
and statistically significant; the point estimate is actually larger than that reported
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in Table 2.3. The larger coefficient suggests these results may in fact overstate the
relationship between organizational concentration and care utilization. Specifically,
patients with high organizational concentration PCPs who consult many doctors may
have less underlying demand for care than patients who see more doctors with a low
organizational concentration PCP. This could occur, for example, if large practices
with greater organizational concentration (because they cover a wider breadth of
specialists) also tend to rotate patients across providers more commonly.
Decomposing the source of utilization changes Appendix Table A7 disaggre-
gates our findings on care utilization to identify how different types of care respond.
Specifically, we consider three categories of utilization: Carrier file claims, which cover
professional billings; Outpatient file claims, which cover institutional claims for outpa-
tient care; and Inpatient file claims, which cover hospital billings. Patients treated by
PCPs with higher organizational concentration have lower spending on professional
services (carrier) and outpatient institutional care. Taken together, these results con-
firm that outpatient care utilization is lower when the PCP has high organizational
concentration. The estimated effect on inpatient spending (conditional on having
an inpatient admission) is also negative, but has a large standard error and is not
statistically significant.
2.6.3 Organizational concentration and quality of care
In this section, we explore the relationship between organizational concentration and
quality of care. While the quality of ambulatory care is multidimensional and diffi-
cult to quantify empirically, we present evidence on a variety of measures related to
the provision of low-value care (duplicate imaging), high-value care (recommended
monitoring of patients with diabetes), and use of intensive care settings (inpatient
or emergency department) which may signal deficiencies in outpatient care. Results
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are reported in Table 2.4. In this table, we report our most controlled specification
from Table 2.3, including PCP provider concentration as an endogenous variable and
controlling for the full set of PCP characteristics and PCP organization size.
An important pathway by which organizational concentration could reduce total
spending is by reducing the use of inpatient care. Recall that we define organizational
concentration solely using outpatient provider interactions. As a result, there is no
direct, mechanical relationship between organizational concentration and the PCP’s
propensity to recommend hospitalization, since care delivered in the hospital setting
will not contribute to the concentration measure. We do not find statistically signifi-
cant effects of changes in organizational concentration on hospital-related outcomes,
though standard errors are large.
Next, we investigate process of care measures for patients with diabetes. We rely
on two quality of care measures, adapted from the HEDIS guidelines: receiving a
regular HbA1c test and LDL test. Switching to a physician with 0.1 higher orga-
nizational concentration leads to a 4.5 percentage point increase in HbA1c testing
and a 5.8 percentage point increase in LDL tests; these relationships are statistically
significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Patients with diabetes are more
likely to receive guideline-concordant care when their PCP has greater organizational
concentration. Recall that this specification does not simply reflect the benefits of
being treated in a large practice group (which might proxy for investment in clinical
decision support or other electronic reminder system), because we control for the size
of the PCP’s practice organization. Rather, this finding suggests that keeping the
patient’s primary and specialty care integrated may lead to fewer gaps in care for
chronically ill patients.
Finally, we turn to testing and imaging. Using BETOS codes, we identify Car-
rier claims for laboratory tests and diagnostic imaging. Changes in organizational
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concentration do not lead to statistically significant changes in the use of lab tests.
By contrast, switching to a more concentrated PCP decreases the number of claims
for imaging tests, with a 0.1 increase in organizational concentration reducing imag-
ing claims by 5% (a decline of 0.2 claims from a base of 4.4, P = 0.056). We also
specifically investigate a measure of repeated imaging, which we define as imaging of
the same body part with the same imaging modality repeated within 30 days. While
some duplication of this sort is clinically indicated, the measure will be sensitive to
repeated imaging that occurs when patients seek care across different organizations
that lack seamless systems for image transfer. The coefficient on repeated imaging is
very imprecisely estimated relative to the mean and not significantly different from
zero. These findings suggest that while reduced imaging may contribute to the uti-
lization reductions, these reductions are not primarily driven by changes to repeated
imaging tests.
Appendix Table A8 further investigates the relationship between organizational
concentration and measures of preventive care provision. We find no consistent pat-
tern between organizational concentration and preventive care. Higher organizational
concentration predicts increases in mammogram and prostate cancer screenings, de-
clines in colorectal cancer screenings, and little change in the provision of pap smears,
pelvic exams, flu shots, and cardiovascular screenings.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the coordination challenges that arise when clinical care is
split across firm boundaries. Firms may facilitate both informal relationships among
care providers, as well as firm-specific investment in coordination technology. In the
healthcare setting, coordination technology could include messaging systems, invest-
ments in health information technology, and established norms for passing off patient
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information across providers.
Studying patients who move regions, we document that regions with higher levels
of organizational concentration also have lower levels of care utilization. This pattern
suggests a role for organizational concentration in explaining regional variation in
healthcare spending.
Our main analysis studies patients who stay in the same area after their PCP exits
the local market due to a retirement or move. Patients who switch to a PCP with
higher organizational concentration experience reductions in care utilization, relative
to patients who switch to a PCP with lower organizational concentration. These
relationships persist after conditioning on detailed measures of how many generalist
and specialist providers the patient sees, and how concentrated the patient’s care is
across those providers. This evidence indicates that the organizational ties between
a patient’s healthcare providers have an impact on their total healthcare utilization.
Our estimated effect (10% decrease in utilization from a 1 SD increase in PCP
organizational concentration) is large relative to other healthcare interventions. By
way of comparison, Agha, Frandsen and Rebitzer (2019) find that moving to a region
with 1 SD higher provider fragmentation increases care utilization by 10%. Clemens
and Gottlieb (2014) estimate that a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a
3 percent increase in healthcare utilization. The introduction of a major policy ini-
tiative, Accountable Care Organizations and the Medicare Shared Savings Program,
led to comparatively small reductions (less than 5%) in spending (McWilliams et al.,
2018).
Although switching to a PCP with greater organizational concentration is associ-
ated with lower total utilization of physician services, we see no evidence that higher
organizational concentration reduces quality of care. In fact, PCPs with greater orga-
nizational concentration perform better on these measures of effective care for patients
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with diabetes.
Taken together, these findings point to a potential mechanism by which higher or-
ganizational concentration lowers utilization. When providers share an organizational
affiliation, they are likely to have lower barriers to information sharing and greater
trust. These benefits may reduce gaps in care—e.g. resulting in better monitoring
of diabetes patients—and improve hand-offs between providers. In turn, these im-
provements may allow providers to avoid unnecessary referrals, ensure that referred
patients have already completed the requisite workup, and centralize follow-up care
with the patient’s PCP. Each of these effects may reduce low-value visits that generate
repeated contact with specialists.
It is also worth considering alternative explanations of these findings. Large orga-
nizations may hire higher-quality physicians. If this were the case, we would expect
that our result would attenuate when we account for the size of the PCP’s organi-
zational affiliation, but our empirical estimates show no such attenuation. Another
possibility is that it may be more difficult to get a timely appointment in a large,
multi-specialty practice, leading to lower care utilization. If this were the primary
explanation, we might expect patients to substitute to more intensive forms of care
that do not require appointments, such as emergency department visits; but, we find
no evidence of substitution along this margin.
While our results suggest potential savings associated with care delivered at in-
tegrated multispecialty practices, any gains from reduced utilization would need to
be weighed against the higher prices likely paid by private insurance providers to
larger practices that have more bargaining power. The Medicare claims we study are
paid at administratively set prices, so an investigation of countervailing price effects
is beyond the scope of this paper. These results also raise the question of whether
horizontal mergers that create multispecialty physician practices generate the savings
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from reduced utilization described here. If these gains occur, they may take time
to develop as providers adapt to changing communication systems and adopt new
referral patterns.
Our findings illuminate the role that firm boundaries play in organizing economic
activity. Future research examining the detailed mechanisms of how these boundaries
affect teamwork and care coordination may be able to show how some of the benefits
of organizational concentration could be replicated without financial integration– for
example, through better integration of health information technology systems, or by
co-locating distinct provider groups.
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Notes: This map shows the mean residuals of patients’ organizational concentration after re-
gression adjustment for regional differences in average provider concentration, age, sex, and
race. Organizational concentration and provider concentration are calculated as Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index based on patients visits across healthcare organizations and providers, re-
spectively. Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in darker gray have higher residual organizational
concentration. Data is from the initial analytic sample, covering 9,132,322 beneficiaries.
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Notes: These binned scatterplots show the relationship between organizational concentration and
total healthcare utilization. Panel (A) shows the relationship between these measures averaged at
the Hospital Referral Region level, while Panel (B) shows the relationship between these measures
averaged at the PCP level.
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Figure 2·3: Event study figures. Based on patient movers.
(a) Response of patients’ organizational concentra-
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Notes: The two subplots show the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from two separate regres-
sions. The dependent variables of subplot A and B are patients’ organizational concentration and
log utilization, respectively. Plots coefficient on the change in regional organizational concentration
interacted with relative year. Both regressions control for patient age (five-year binned), calendar
year fixed effects, and patient fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at HRR and patient level.
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Figure 2·4: Event study figures. Based on PCP exit.
(a) Response of patients’ organizational concentra-
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Notes: The two subplots show the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from two separate regres-
sions. The dependent variables of subplot A and B are patients’ organizational concentration and
log utilization, respectively. Regression specification matches the instrumental variable regressions
in Table 2.3 column 1 (for Panel A) and column 2 (for Panel B), except that the post variable is
now a vector of fixed effects for relative year. Both regressions control for patient age (five-year
binned), calendar year fixed effects, and patient fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at PCP
and patient level.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of different samples
(1) (2) (3)
Broad Sample Patient Mover Sample PCP Exit Sample
Organizational concentration 0.45 0.42 0.46
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25)
Provider concentration 0.38 0.34 0.38
(0.27) (0.24) (0.25)
Total utilization ($) 8641 8673 6512
(17,487) (17,127) (12,722)
Age 76.1 76.34 77.19
(7.48) (7.38) (7.18)
Sex: Female 0.59 0.59 0.63
Race: White 0.86 0.87 0.86
Has Diabetes 0.28 0.29 0.33
Has Hypertension 0.62 0.65 0.73
Has Heart disease 0.32 0.34 0.3
N patient-year obs 48,436,521 7,576,900 335,868
N patients 9,132,322 1,389,790 62,924
N assigned PCPs 52,981
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the various analytic subsamples. Column
1 describes the Broad Sample. Column 2 reports the sample underlying our mover analysis,
including both patients who move and the 25% random sample of non-movers. Column 3
reports summary statistics only for patients who move. Column 4 reports summary statistics
for the analytic sample underlying our analysis of PCP exits. This sample restricts to patients
whose PCP exits the local market. The number of assigned PCP in column 4 includes exiting
PCPs as well as the PCPs patients switched to.
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Table 2.2: Patient movers and regional organizational concentration
(1) (2) (3)
OrgConcit Log(total utilization)it
∆OrgConcregion(i) × postit 0.797*** -0.916*** -0.735***
(0.021) (0.099) (0.113)
Regional provider concentration X
Notes: All regressions control for patient age (five-year binned), calendar year fixed effects,
relative year fixed effects, and patient fixed effects. Regional organizational concentration is
jackknifed. Standard errors are clustered at HRR and patient level. Sample: Movers Analysis
Sample, N=7,576,900 patient-year observations.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.3: Organizational concentration and spending, identified from
PCP exits
Instrumental Variables
Second stage (1) (2) (3) (4)
OrgConcit Log(total utilization)it
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit 0.293*** -1.058*** -0.729*** -0.794***
(0.021) (0.118) (0.251) (0.246)
First stage (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit
OrgConcPCP (i)t−1 × postit -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.295*** -0.299***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
F-test 1.0 ∗ 105 1.0 ∗ 105 20,703 23,845
PCP provider concentration X X
PCP characteristics X
PCP organizational size X
Notes: Each column represents an instrumental variables regression, where instrumental
variable is the exiting PCP’s jackknifed organizational concentration multiplied by a post
indicator. In specification (1), the outcome variable is the individual patient’s realized
organizational concentration and in specifications (2)-(4) the outcome variable is the patient’s
log of total utilization. All regressions control for patient age (five-year binned), calendar year
fixed effects, relative year fixed effects, and patient fixed effects. Specifications (3) and (4)
include PCP provider concentration as an additional endogenous variable, instrumented by the
original PCP’s provider concentration multiplied by a post indicator. Specification (4) controls
for PCP characteristics: gender, experience quartile indicators, residency training indicators
(internal medicine vs. family practice), and the PCP’s organization size (log total number of
claims billed to the PCP’s TIN, and the log number of unique providers billing to the PCP’s
TIN). Standard errors have two-way clustering at PCP and patient levels. Cragg-Donald Wald
F-test reported for first-stage. The PCP Exit Sample has 335,868 patient-year observations.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.4: Organizational concentration and measures of quality
(1) (2)
Mean of Coefficient on
dependent variable ∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit
Dependent variable:
A. Hospital outcomes
Any inpatient visit 0.155 -0.001
(0.072)
Any emergency department visit 0.259 -0.022
(0.083)
B. Diabetes care outcomes
Any HbA1C test 0.631 0.452**
(0.189)
Any LDL test 0.590 0.578***
(0.195)
C. Imaging use outcomes
Number of lab test claims 14.245 0.358
(3.356)
Number of imaging test claims 4.417 -2.127*
(1.112)
Number of repeated imaging tests 0.263 0.163
(0.294)
Notes: Each row corresponds to a regression. The specifications match that reported in column
(4) of Table 2.3, but with alternative dependent variables. Specifically, all regressions control
for changes in PCP provider concentration, PCP characteristics, PCP organization size, as
well as patient age (five-year binned), calendar year fixed effects, relative year fixed effects,
patient fixed effects. Both changes in PCP organizational concentration and changes in PCP
provider concentration are instrumented for using the exiting PCP’s practice style. Standard
errors are clustered at PCP and patient level. Panels A and C use the full PCP Exit Sample
(335,868 patient-year observations). Panel B uses the subset of the PCP Exit Sample of patients
identified with diabetes as chronic condition (105,940 patient-year observations).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Chapter 2 Appendix Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Mapping from provider taxonomy codes to specialties
Specialty Provider taxonomy codes
PCP 207Q00000X, 207QA0000X, 207QA0505X, 207QG0300X,
207R00000X, 207RA0000X, 207RG0300X, 208000000X,
2080A0000X, 208D00000X
Notes: These codes are used to define primary care specialties from the National Plan and
Provider Enumeration System (NPPES).
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Table A2: List of place of service codes included as outpatient care
Place of Service Code Place of Service Name
05 Indian Health Service Free-standing Facility
07 Tribal 638 Free-standing Facility
11 Office
17 Walk-in Retail Health Clinic
20 Urgent Care Facility
22 On Campus-Outpatient Hospital
49 Independent Clinic
50 Federally Qualified Health Center
53 Community Mental Health Center
57 Non-residential Substance Abuse Treatment Facility
58 Non-residential Opioid Treatment Facility
62 Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility
65 End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Facility
71 Public Health Clinic
72 Rural Health Clinic
Notes: These codes are used to identify claims in the Medicare Carrier File for services that
take place in an outpatient facility.
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Organizational concentration 0.50 0.24
Provider concentration 0.43 0.25
Total utilization 9116 14,800
PCP level (N=190,616)
Organizational concentration (raw) 0.49 0.16
Organizational concentration (adjusted for statistical noise) 0.48 0.13
Provider concentration (raw) 0.39 0.15
Provider concentration (adjusted for statistical noise) 0.38 0.11
Total utilization 9377 11,263
Regional level (N=306)
Organizational concentration 0.47 0.05
Provider concentration 0.38 0.03
Total utilization 8465 918
Notes: This table summarizes provider concentration, organization concentration, and utiliza-
tion outcomes at different levels of aggregation. The top panel has one observation per patient,
and reports the means and standard deviations across all patients. The middle panel has one
observation per PCP (averaged across patient-year observations), and reports the mean and
standard deviation across PCPs. The bottom panel has one observation per Hospital Referral
Region (averaged across patient-year observations) and reports the mean and standard devia-
tion across regions.
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Table A4: Difference in differences analysis of PCP exits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OrgConcit Log(total utilization)it
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit 0.340*** -0.623*** -0.088 -0.132
(0.010) (0.057) (0.084) (0.086)
PCP provider concentration X X
PCP characteristics X
PCP organizational size X
Notes: This table shows the difference in differences estimates of equation 2.4 without
using the instrumental variable strategy to predict variation in the change in organizational
concentration after a PCP exit. In specification 1, the outcome variable is the individual
patient’s realized organizational concentration and in specifications 2-4 the outcome variable
is the patient’s log of total utilization in specifications. All regressions control for patient
age (five-year binned), calendar year fixed effects, relative year fixed effects, and patient
fixed effects. Specifications 3 and 4 include PCP provider concentration as an additional
endogenous variable, instrumented by the original PCP’s provider concentration multiplied
by a post indicator. Specification 4 controls for PCP characteristics: gender, experience
quartile indicators, training indicators (internal medicine vs. family practice), and the PCP’s
organization size (log total number of claims billed to the PCP’s TIN, and the log number
of unique providers billing to the PCP’s TIN). There are 335,868 patient-year observations.
Standard errors have two-way clustering at PCP and patient levels.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A5: Instrumental variable analysis of PCP exits, controlling for
number of physicians the patient consults
Instrumental Variables
Second stage (1) (2)
Log(total utilization)it
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit -0.794*** -1.451***
(0.246) (0.195)
First stage (3) (4)
∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit
OrgConcPCP (i)t−1 × postit -0.299*** -0.310***
(0.007) (0.007)
F-test 23,845 23,733
PCP provider concentration X X
PCP characteristics X X
PCP organizational size X X
Spline N generalists seen by patient X
Spline N specialists seen by patient X
Notes: See notes to Table 2.3. For reference, specifications (1) and (3) replicate the results
reported in (4) and (8) of Table 2.3. In specification (2) and (4), the regression adds new control
variables that account for the number of distinct providers each patient sees. Specifically,
these specifications control for a 4-knot spline in the number of generalist providers (as defined
in Table A1: family practice, internal medicine training, or geriatrics training) and a 4-knot
spline in the number of specialist providers (with any other training type). Standard errors
have two-way clustering at PCP and patient levels.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Second stage (1) (2) (3)
Log(total utilization)it
∆OrganizationConcPCP (i) × postit -0.729*** -0.794***
(0.251) (0.246)
∆ProviderConcPCP (i) × postit -1.072*** -0.453 -0.279
(0.108) (0.248) (0.243)
PCP characteristics X
PCP organization size X
Notes: This table reports the results of instrumental variables regressions similar to those
reported in Table 2.3, but now providing further detail on the relationship between PCP
provider concentration and care utilization. Column 1 reports a specification similar to that in
column 2 of Table 2.3, but replacing the endogenous and instrumental variables related to PCP
organizational concentration with analogous variables describing PCP provider concentration.
Columns 2 and 3 are identical to the specifications reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3,
which include both PCP organizational concentration and PCP provider concentration as
endogenous variables, but here we report the coefficient on PCP provider concentration. There
are 335,868 patient-year observations. Standard errors have two-way clustering at PCP and
patient levels. See notes to Table 2.3 for further details.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A7: Instrumental variable analysis of PCP exits, spending de-
composition
(1) (2) (3)
Mean of dependent Sample Coefficient on
variable (not log) size ∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit
Dependent variable:
Log of carrier spending (professional) 2663 335,868 -0.426**
(0.189)
Log of outpatient spending (institutional) 1364 335,868 -1.397**
(0.586)
Log of inpatient spending (hospital, if > 0) 16,507 35,002 -0.402
(0.538)
Notes: See notes to Table 2.3. This table replicates the instrumental variable specification
reported in Table 2.3 columns (4) and (8) with alternative outcome variables that decompose
Medicare billing depending on the type of bill. Inpatient billings are only defined among
patients with at least one hospitalization. Sample size is 335,868 for carrier and outpatient
claims; sample size is 35,002 for inpatient claims.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A8: Organizational concentration and preventive care
(1) (2)
Mean of Coefficient on
dependent variable ∆OrgConcPCP (i) × postit
Dependent variable:
A. Preventive care for women (N = 211, 823)
Mammogram 0.567 0.423**
(0.174)
Pap smear 0.165 -0.209
(0.129)
Pelvic exam 0.142 -0.006
(0.114)
B. Preventive care for men (N = 124, 042)
Prostate cancer screening 0.273 0.648***
(0.227)
C. Preventive care for full sample (N = 335, 868)
Flu shot 0.671 0.048
(0.119)
Colorectal screening 0.157 -0.581***
(0.097)
Cardiovascular screening 0.909 -0.239
(0.258)
Notes: Each row corresponds to a regression. The specifications match that reported in
column (4) of Table 2.3, but with alternative dependent variables. Specifically, all regressions
control for changes in PCP provider concentration, PCP characteristics, PCP organization
size, as well as patient age (five-year binned), calendar year fixed effects, relative year fixed
effects, patient fixed effects. Both changes in PCP organizational concentration and changes in
PCP provider concentration are instrumented using the exiting PCP’s practice style. Standard
errors are clustered at PCP and patient level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Chapter 3
Does Physician Affiliation Matter? The
Effects of Physician Vertical Integration




Approximately 1 million physicians currently practice in the United States. The
practice environment for U.S. physicians is rapidly changing. Rather than practice
in traditional models of independent or solo practices, many physicians are now em-
ployed by hospitals or health systems. From 2012 to 2018, the share of physician
practices employed by a hospital or health system increased from 46.8% to 54.1%
(Kane, 2019). From a clinical perspective, vertical integration of physicians and hos-
pitals is designed to enable care coordination, investments in technology, and improve
patient care. At the same time, vertical integration has also raised important market
competition questions. Physicians and hospitals that vertically integrate may do so to
increase bargaining leverage with private insurers. Internalizing the bargaining lever-
age of larger hospitals allows for smaller physicians to obtain higher reimbursement
rates (Peters (2014); Dafny, Ho and Lee (2019a)). Consistent with this model, several
existing studies find that vertical integration leads to increases in prices (Capps, Dra-
nove and Ody, 2018; Baker et al., 2014; Baker, Bundorf and Kessler, 2020b; Chernew
115
et al., 2018).
A potentially more consequential impact for the market competition is the impact
of vertical integration on patient demand and allocation of patients across providers.
Unlike many other markets, physicians often act as gatekeepers for patients (Chernew
et al., 2018). Other studies have raised the potential that hospitals may acquire “up-
stream” physician practices in the hopes of steering patient demand for “downstream”
services to the hospital (Baker, Bundorf and Kessler, 2016a). This type of behavior
follows common models of input foreclosure, but with few exceptions, how hospitals
use vertical integration to foreclose inputs has not been fully examined. While broad
acknowledgment of potential for input foreclosure exists, measuring the impacts of
physician vertical integration on patient demand for hospitals remains limited. In
addition, the existing and extensive literature on health care market competition has
primarily focused on horizontal competition between hospitals (Dafny, Ho and Lee,
2019b), but has not fully considered how vertical integration can, in turn, impact
horizontal competition. Related work examines the impact of vertical integration on
self-referrals for skilled nursing facilities Cutler et al. (2020) and for outpatient pro-
cedures in Florida (Richards, Seward and Whaley, 2020). Fully understanding these
impacts is especially important given the size of the U.S. health care market and how
rapidly physician practices are vertically integrating.
In this paper, we use data covering 2013 to 2017 from a 100% sample of the
U.S. fee-for-service Medicare population to test how vertical integration between
physicians and hospital groups changes patient demand for downstream hospital
services.1 We focus on two procedures of particular interest—arthroscopy surgeries
and colonoscopies. Both procedures are extremely common among the Medicare
population—our data includes 1.5 million arthroscopy and 13 million colonoscopy
1Medicare is the U.S. insurance system that provides health benefits to elderly (above age 65)
and disabled individuals.
116
procedures. In addition, both procedures are commonly performed in two distinct
provider organizations—hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs), which are a unit
of a traditional hospital, and ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs), which are free-
standing centers that are often independent from hospitals. Several other studies
have compared ASCs and HOPDs, and generally found that ASCs are less costly and
have equivalent or higher quality (e.g., Gardner et al. (2005); Grisel and Arjmand
(2009); Munnich and Parente (2014)).
Examining how vertical integration impacts competition between ASCs and HOPDs
is particularly relevant in the Medicare population, as Medicare imposes strict fee
schedules that pay each provider organization different rates. Unlike private in-
surance markets, where prices are negotiated, vertical integration does not allow
providers to negotiate higher prices with the Medicare system. However, Medicare
reimburses ASCs at approximately one-half to two-thirds the reimbursement rate for
HOPDs.2 For example, in a common procedure we examine, a colonoscopy with a
biopsy, Medicare pays $715 for procedures performed in an ASC and $1,212 for pro-
cedures performed in HOPDs. From a purely financial standpoint, performing the
same procedure in an HOPD instead of an ASC creates an arbitrage opportunity to
increase Medicare payment by nearly 70% (Chernew (2021)). If vertical integration
leads to increases in the use of HOPDs, this payment differential based on site of
care potentially serves as both a motivation for and a consequence of hospital ac-
quisition of physician practices. Through this channel, moving patient volume from
ASCs to HOPDs can lead to increased revenue for acquirer organizations. Related
work finds that increases in site-based payment differentials contribute to physician
vertical integration (Post et al. (2021)).
To address these questions, we leverage changes in primary care physician affili-
2Procedure-specific prices by site-of-care are available at https://www.medicare.gov/procedure-
price-lookup/.
117
ation to examine how patients choose between HOPDs and ASCs for “downstream”
procedures. Starting with an aggregated-level analysis, we find reduced-form evidence
that hospital employment of physician practices shifts patient demand to hospitals
and away from ASCs. Our group-level analysis shows that for both procedures, follow-
ing vertical integration, there is a 3.7 percentage point increase in the use of HOPDs
instead of ASCs, which translates to a 6.3% relative increase for arthroscopy, and a
7.5% relative increase for colonoscopies. We also find increases in the travel distance
between the patient and the provider (1.6 miles for arthroscopies and 1.1 miles for
colonoscopies). Importantly, we find no change in clinical quality measures.
We then use a nested logit discrete choice model to describe the patient-physician
joint decision of healthcare delivery organization for the “downstream” procedures.
Our model estimates suggest that vertical integration leads to a 14.2% and 32%
higher probability of choosing an HOPD rather than an ASC for arthroscopy and
colonoscopy, respectively. At an aggregated level, our results imply that for just
these two services, changing from status-quo vertical relationships for all physicians
will lead to an increase of 309,090 cases in the use of HOPDs, a $38.2 million increase
in patients’ out-of-pocket payment, and a $316 million increase in Medicare spending.
At the same time, while existing studies on health care market competition con-
sider horizontal competition between hospitals, few studies have considered horizontal
competition between different delivery organizations, for example, ASCs and HOPDs.
Existing studies have also not fully examined how changes in vertical relationships
for upstream providers, in this case, primary care physicians, can lead to changes in
horizontal competition for downstream providers. We extend our results and exam-
ine how the changes in referral patterns caused by vertical integration can lead to
changes in horizontal market competition. We find that vertical integration leads to
a meaningful increase in horizontal concentration among PCP groups, but does not
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meaningfully change horizontal concentration for downstream surgical providers.
Our results have implications for the economics of understanding provider com-
petition in an important market and also important policy implications. Medicare
and other insurers commonly pay health care providers different amounts for care
performed in different settings. To the extent to which site of care payment differen-
tials motivate vertical integration, our results show the impacts of allocation changes
following vertical integration for both the Medicare system and patients. At the same
time and independent of changes to payment policies, regulators have faced questions
of how to address vertical integration. Our results show a clear link between vertical
integration and horizontal competition, which regulators can apply when monitoring
consolidation activity.
3.2 Data
We use data from a 100% sample of Medicare claims data that covers the 2013 to
2017 period. This data includes all inpatient, outpatient, physician, and other types
of care for Medicare enrollees who are enrolled in Traditional Medicare (e.g., fee-for-
service Medicare). We do not have information on Medicare Advantage enrollees or
non-Medicare patients. These data include approximately 38 million enrollees per
year. The breadth of this data allows us to examine the market structure of the
entire provider market in the US.
With the data, we identify two specific procedures of interest—joint arthroscopy
and colonoscopy. Joint arthroscopy is a minimally-invasive surgical procedure used
to diagnose and repair minor joint damage. Colonoscopies are a procedure used to
screen for and to treat early-stage colorectal cancer.3 We restrict our sample to
3The CPT codes for joint arthroscopy procedures are 29830, 29831, 29832, 29833, 29834, 29835,
29836, 29837, 29838, 29862, 29870, 29871, 29872, 29873, 29874, 29875, 29876, 29877, 29878, 29879,
29880, 29881, 29882, 29883, 29884, 29885, 29886, 29887, 29805, 29806, 29807, 29808, 29809, 29810,
29811, 29812, 29813, 29814, 29815, 29816, 29817, 29818, 29819, 29820, 29821, 29822, 29823, 29824,
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beneficiaries between ages 65 and 100 and who are continuously enrolled in Medicare
for all 12 months in a year. We also exclude cases where the patient and provider are
located more than 100 miles apart. After imposing all those restrictions, we obtain
two full samples, one for each procedure. The joint arthroscopy full sample has
1,998,620 observations from 709,154 beneficiaries, 53,823 primary care groups, and
8,747 joint arthroscopy providers. For colonoscopy procedures, the full sample has
17,765,556 observations from 7,230,249 beneficiaries, 79,653 PCP groups, and 21,745
colonoscopy providers.
For each procedure, we identified if the procedure was performed in an Ambu-
latory Surgical Center (ASC) or a Hospital Outpatient Department (HOPD), using
the site of care codes contained in the Medicare claims. We limited the procedures
to those performed in outpatient settings and excluded the small number proce-
dures performed in other settings, such as physician office, inpatient, and emergency
department settings. Of these, 42% of arthroscopies and 51% of colonoscopies were
performed in an ASC instead of an HOPD. As secondary outcomes, we also measured
the total Medicare reimbursement amount for each procedure and patient payments,
and the distance between the centroid of the patient’s zip code and the zip code as
the provider.4 Finally, an advantage of these procedures is the existence of clinical
complication measures. For each procedure, we identified both procedure and post-
operative complications using the approach applied in previous studies, which we
measure as the z-score of complication rates (Robinson, Brown and Whaley (2015),
Whaley and Brown (2018), Whaley, Guo and Brown (2017), Aouad, Brown and
Whaley (2019)). These complications, which are fully listed in Appendix Tables A1
29825, 29826, 29846. The CPT codes for colonoscopy procedures are 44388, 44389, 44390, 44391,
44392, 44393, 44394, 45378, 45379, 45380, 45381, 45382, 45384, 45385, G6019, G0104, G0120, G0121,
G2204, G6020, G6024, G6025, G9252, G9253, G9659, G9660, G9661, G9933, G9935, G9936, G9937.
4The internal point is defined by the Census Bureau. We used the NBER zip code distance
database in which the distance is calculated using the Haversine formula based on internal points in
the zip code area.
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and A2 , include adverse outcomes like intestine perforations, cardiac events, and
readmissions. Because procedural complications are rare, we use the z-score of the
fraction of patients having any complications as the complication rate. The compli-
cation rates are thus measured as the standardized share of patients that have any
procedure-related complications.
3.2.1 Group identification and integration status
In addition to information on procedure types, we also used the data to collect infor-
mation on patient primary care. Existing studies on vertical integration and referrals
have examined market-level trends in vertical integration Scheffler, Arnold and Wha-
ley (2018) and integration status of referring papers (e.g., Baker, Bundorf and Kessler
(2016b); Chernew et al. (2018)). A challenge with market-level vertical integration
or referring-level measures is the potential that changes in patient allocation occur
before a patient is referred to a specific provider. We instead examine the impact
of changes in the referral status of the patients’ primary care provider. Doing so
allows us to measure the impacts of vertical integration on patient allocation using
the patient’s initial contact with the health care delivery system. To construct pa-
tient vertical integration measures, we identify the physician group that provides the
majority of primary care services to the patient. A full description of the attribution
model used is described in Appendix A.
Consistent with existing studies, in our sample, we find an increasing trend in
the share of providers that are vertically integrated. This trend is similar to results
from surveys conducted by the American Medical Association (Kane, 2019). Figure 1
shows this trend from 2013-2017. As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, the number
of physicians working at an integrated group increased from 40.6% to 44.4%. The
increase in physician group vertical integration is accompanied by a 19.5% increase
(from 33.9% to 40.5%) in the number of Medicare beneficiaries who receive primary
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care from a vertically integrated group. This larger increase in the number of benefi-
ciaries provides descriptive evidence that the groups that became vertically integrated
during this period are larger than groups that did not integrate and that the PCP
market became more concentrated over the 2013 to 2017 period.
3.2.2 Market definition
We define markets based on a combination of geographical region and patient flow.
Traditional fixed geographical market definitions do not vary from year to year and
prohibit patients from choosing from other regions, even though some patients may
live close to a geographical boundary. To relax these restrictions, we use a geography
and patient flow combined measure. First, we use a fixed geographic market of
Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs), which have been constructed by the Dartmouth
Atlas of Care to measure hospital market areas (Atlas et al. (2009)). Starting from
an individual HRR, we include all the options into the choice set for an HRR if they
have ever been chosen by patients in this region and the distance to the patient is
shorter than 100 miles. Using this market definition, we allow market boundaries to
vary across years and allow patients to travel across HRRs if the options are popular
in their HRRs and not too far from their homes. Following the definition, the average
market has 365 arthroscopy patients (596 observations) and 4482 colonoscopy patients
(5586 observations). Our market definition also contains a mean of 26 arthroscopy
providers, of which 16 are hospital-based, and 76 colonoscopy providers, of which 45
are hospital-based.
3.2.3 Sample construction
We construct two separate analytic samples, one for our reduced-form analysis that
measures physician-group level changes in referral patterns following vertical inte-
gration, and another separate sample for our patient choice model. First, for our
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physician group-level reduced-form analysis, we start by assigning each PCP group a
home state, which is the one from which most of the patients reside. This assignment
is necessary for groups operating in multiple states because the local environment,
the Medicare fee schedule system, and traveling distance vary across states. We also
exclude groups who churned in and out of systems between 2013 and 2017. After
that, we aggregate visits to PCP group-state-month-procedure code level. We count
the number of visits as the total volume and the number of visits in hospital-based
facilities as hospital-based volume. For the other outcome variables, we use the av-
erage value within each cell. The reduced-form sample has 780,078 observations of
50,393 PCP groups for joint arthroscopy, and 2,665,339 observations of 74,235 PCP
groups for colonoscopy.
The second sample is constructed for our choice model. We first apply the afore-
mentioned market definition. Then, we restrict patients’ choices to popular choices.
For each market, we drop providers whose number of visits is below the median,
keep the most popular five providers, and group the rest of them into two “others”
options—one for hospital-based choices and the other one for independent choices.
The last step of sample construction is dealing with repeated choices. In our sample,
less than 50% of arthroscopy patients and 25% colonoscopy patients have more than
one visit. For the main analysis, we keep all the visits and assume that each visit
decision is made independently. 5 The final arthroscopy choice model sample in-
cludes 273,485 beneficiaries, 20,444 primary care groups, and 3,968 joint arthroscopy
providers. The colonoscopy sample has 4,576,543 beneficiaries, 41,687 PCP groups,
and 7,875 colonoscopy providers. Due to computational limitations, we use a 25%
random sample of the final choice model samples for estimation. Note that the most
important contribution of a 100% sample is to have a complete choice set and ac-
5We also tried a more restricted sample which only includes patients who have only one visit.
The results are robust to this sample selection.
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curate characteristics for each option in the choice set. In our 25% random sample,
beneficiaries’ choice sets are constructed based on the 100% sample.
Descriptive characteristics of each sample are presented in Table 1. Panel A
presents characteristics of the group-level sample used for the reduced-form analysis,
and Panel B presents characteristics of the patient-level sample used for the patient
choice analysis.
3.3 Relationship between vertical integration and group-level
outcomes
In this section, we use group-level aggregated data to examine the effects of vertical
integration on site-of-care choice and other outcomes that patients care about.
3.3.1 Reduced Form Effects of Vertical Integration On Allocation and
Patient Outcomes
To measure the reduced form effect of vertical integration on each of our five outcomes,
we use a difference-in-differences approach. We estimate a regression model of the
form
Yjt = θ V Ijt + δt + ζj + εjt (3.1)
where Yjt is the outcome of interest (e.g, ASC vs. HOPD, Medicare spending, travel
distance, and procedure complication rate), V Ijt is an indicator of being vertically
integrated for group j in time t, δt and ζj are time fixed effect and group fixed effect,
respectively. The coefficient θ identifies how changes in dependent variables relate to
changing to vertically integrated. We estimate this model using OLS regressions and
cluster standard errors at the group ( j) level.
Our primary identification assumption is that groups who select into vertical inte-
gration arraignments do so independently of changes to the outcomes we measure. We
include physician group fixed effects, which account for any time-invariant differences
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between groups (e.g., the referral pattern preferences or patient composition). A po-
tential threat to our identification is if PCP groups select into vertical integration due
to factors that impact our outcomes (e.g., changes in underlying patient preferences
for ASCs vs. HOPDs). In such a case, trends in our outcome variables of interest
will likely change prior to vertical integration events. To test for these trends, we
also estimate event study regressions that test for the “parallel trends” assumption
common in difference-in-differences designs.
Table 3.2 reports our reduced-form regression results. The top panel shows results
for arthroscopy procedures, and the bottom panel presents results for colonoscopy
procedures. Column (1) shows that becoming vertically integrated leads to a 3.7
percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving an arthroscopy procedure at
an HOPD, which translates to an approximately 6.3% relative increase. Along with
the increase in the probability, the average Medicare spending increased by $6.5. This
effect on the Medicare allowed amount outcome is insignificant and relatively small.
Due to the reasons discussed in the previous section, the effect on the allowed amount
is underestimated. Columns (3) and (4) show that patient payments increase by
$15.15 more OOP and travel distance increases by 1.6 miles more for an arthroscopy
procedure, which is a 10% increase in patient’s travel distance.
In the bottom panel, the reduced form effects of vertical integration are similar
for colonoscopy procedures. Columns (6) to (9) suggest that primary care provider
vertical integration leads to an increase of 7.5% in the probability of receiving a
colonoscopy in an HOPD, an increase of $7.1 in Medicare spending, a $9.5 increase
in patients’ OOP payment, and an additional 1.1 miles of traveling distance (a 9%
relative increase). For both arthroscopy and colonoscopy, we do not find differences
between vertical integration and our quality measures. The lack of a relationship
suggests that the quality of arthroscopy and colonoscopy procedures has a very limited
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relationship with the place of service.
As an additional test of our reduced form effects, Figure 3·2 presents event study
graphs that measure how each outcome changes in the months before and after verti-
cal integration. Consistent with our difference-in-difference results, following vertical
integration of primary care groups, patients are more likely to go to HOPDs and travel
further for both downstream surgical procedures. Importantly, we do find evidence
that these trends in these changes occur prior to vertical integration, which supports
the assumptions necessary for a causal interpretation of our results.
3.4 Effect of Vertical Integration on Downstream Provider
Choice
Our reduced-form approach measures the effects of vertical integration at an aggre-
gated level. A limitation of this strategy is that the vertical integration indicator
might be correlated with time-variant group characteristics, such as characteristics
of patients. To mitigate this concern, we employ a discrete choice model for the
choice of downstream providers. In this model, we include all three parties–patients,
PCP groups, and downstream surgeons. Thus, this model enables us to incorporate
patients’ characteristics into the referral decision.
3.4.1 Patient and Provider Utility Function
To model patient choice of provider, we start with the patients’ perspective. In the
most straightforward approach, patients select surgeons based on how much they will
pay for the procedure, the quality of the surgeon, and how long they need to travel.
In addition to provider characteristics, patients’ own characteristics also affect their
utility, For example, patients with different age and gender may obtain different level
of utility from a given provider. Therefore, we assume that patient i’s utility from
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W + δt + ξikt (3.2)
where Xpatit is a vector of patient’s characteristics—age and gender, dik is the travel
distance between patient i and provider k, Xsurgk is a vector of surgeon’s characteristics
such as average patient payments and complications rate, Wt is a vector that contains
region information, and δt is a time fixed effect.
However, the selection of downstream providers is not driven just by patient prefer-
ences, but instead incorporates provider decision-making and referral patterns. Sev-
eral papers expand upon the model of patient choice in equation (2). Healthcare
providers are altruistic—they take account their patients’ utility in addition to their
own preferences (Arrow (1963); McGuire (2000)). Rather than an isolated patient
decision, the selection of surgeons for a downstream service is a joint decision that de-
pends on both the patients’ utility and the PCPs’ own preference. When PCP groups
are vertically integrated with hospitals or health systems, they will be strongly incen-
tivized, if not required, to refer patients to their owning hospitals or systems, while
independent PCP groups do not have such incentive.
We model this joint decision by expanding equation (2) to include both patient
and provider predictors of choice. We estimate the choice utility of referring patient










In this model, Xpcpji is a vector of PCP characteristics such as group size, V I(j(i)t) is
an indicator of whether PCP j is integrated at time t. ε(ij(i)kt) is the idiosyncratic
error that follows the Gumbel distribution. In our model, patients’ PCP are assigned
annually. Thus, for a given patient i in market t, the patient’s PCP j is given. To
127
simplify the notation, we will eliminate the subscript j thereafter.
3.4.2 Model Structure
As discussed above, our two downstream services, colonoscopies and arthroscopies,
can be performed in two separate delivery organizations–hospital-based facilities (e.g.,
HOPD) and independent facilities (e.g., ASC). The preference of patients and PCPs
over these two facility types are not completely captured by the observed charac-
teristics. Because of the obvious difference between the two types, the unobserved
provider characteristics could be systematically different. Therefore, we assume that
patients and PCPs have different sensitivities for the two types. In the model, we
group surgeons based on their facility types and use a nested-logit model to describe
the joint choice of surgeon (McFadden (1980); Goldberg (1995)). Our model has two
virtual levels—top-level for facility type and bottom-level for surgeons. The top-level
includes the two aforementioned facility types. For each facility type, at the bottom-
level, the choice set includes all the popular surgeons with that facility type and an
“others” option constructed by grouping all the less popular surgeons with that fa-
cility type. A surgeon is classified as popular in a market if the number of her/his
patients ranks at the top 5 among all surgeons in that market. The outside option is
not having any procedure.
Let C1 ∈ {H, I} denotes the top level choice and C2 ∈ {KH , KI} denotes the
bottom level choice. At the bottom-level, we model the choice by a multinomial logit
model. The conditional probability of patient i choosing surgeon k ∈ Kf given facility
type f is
Pr(C2 = k|C1 = f) =
exp((dikβ
d +Xsurgk β





where τf is the dissimilarity parameter, indicating how similar the two types are. The
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more closer to one the τf is, the more similar the two types.
At the top-level, the probability of patient i choosing facility type f is
Pr(C1 = f) =
exp(Xpi βf + τfIf )∑
s∈{H,I} exp(X
p
i βs + τsIs)
(3.5)
where Xpf represents is a vector of patient-PCP group characteristics. Linking to the
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Since the integration decision needs a relatively long preparation time and it is
made at the PCP group level instead of the PCP level, we assume away the endo-
geneity of the VI indicator in our model.
3.5 Choice Model Results
Table 3.3 presents the estimates from the choice model with different specifications for
arthroscopy and colonoscopy. At the bottom of each column, we report the average
marginal effect of vertical integration on the top-level choice probability. For joint
arthroscopy procedures, column (1) shows that when a patient’s PCP group changes
from independent to vertically integrated, this patient will be 2.84 percentage points
more likely to go to a hospital-based facility for the arthroscopy procedure. Compared
to the average hospital-based volume share of 56%, this increase translates to a 5.1%
relative increase. In column (2), we add three market characteristics—per capita
income, the number of non-federal PCPs, and the number of non-federal MDs—to
control for the geographical income variation and the market concentration. After
controlling for the market characteristics, the effect of vertical integration reduces
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slightly, from 2.84 percentage points to 2.82 percentage points. In Column (3), we
allow for the interaction between OOP payment and complication rate. In this way,
the trade-off between OOP payment and quality is flexible. This modification does not
meaningfully change the estimates. The model corresponding to column (4) allows
for the interaction between surgeon characteristics and the PCP group integration
status. This specification relaxes the assumption that patients and PCPs respond
to the procedure price and quality in the same way, regardless of whether the PCP
group is integrated or independent. When this interaction is included, the effect of
vertical integration increases to 3.24 percentage points, a 5.6% relative increase.
For colonoscopy procedures, the results in column (5) show that becoming ver-
tically integrated leads to a 6.70 percentage points increase in the probability of
referring to a hospital-based facility, which translates to a 14.6% relative increase
in the average hospital-based volume share. The average marginal effect reduces to
6.59 percentage points when we control for market characteristics. When the model
includes the interaction between OOP payment and complication rate, the effect of
vertical integration is 6.63 percentage points. In our final specification that allows for
the interaction between surgeon characteristics and PCP group integration status, we
estimate a 7.1 percentage point increase in HOPD use, which translates to a 14.4%
relative increase.
3.5.1 Counterfactual analysis
Our estimates show that vertically integrated groups have a significantly higher proba-
bility of referring patients to hospital-based facilities rather than free-standing (ASC)
facilities. In this section, we compare the observed scenario to two counterfactual
market structures—a fully vertically integrated market and a fully independent mar-
ket. By comparing with the two counterfactual scenarios, we estimate the welfare
effects of vertical integration and the effects on non-monetary dimensions. To do so,
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we change the integration indicator to either one or zero for all PCP groups to reflect
the counterfactual settings. Based on the estimates obtained from the choice model
estimation, we predict patients’ choice probability and assess the effect of vertical
integration on the volume, the payment, traveling distances, and quality. The results
are reported in the table 3.5.
Starting with the changes in site-of-care volume, we estimate that for arthroscopy,
when all the PCP groups are vertically integrated, an estimated 16.7 thousand more
visits to hospital-based facilities will occur–an 11.4% increase in volume. However,
this estimate does not mean that all the hospital-based facilities will receive more
patients. If changing to the other scenario, where all the PCP groups are independent,
then the total volume of hospital-based visits will decrease by 8.8 thousand visits. The
changes for colonoscopy are similar but with a larger magnitude. The number of visits
at hospital-based facilities will increase by 341.9 thousand (15.8%) if all PCP groups
are integrated and decrease by 195.6 thousand if all PCP groups are independent.
Those changes in volume lead to changes of millions of dollars in Medicare pay-
ments. To assess the effect on payments, we assume that the average level of payment
for each surgeon remains the same in the counterfactual settings. This assumption is
likely valid because PCP group integration has little influence, if any, on the Medicare
fee schedule for downstream providers. Our estimates imply that if all PCP groups
are vertically integrated, then patients payments will increase by $4.7 million for
joint arthroscopy procedures and by $35.5 million for colonoscopy procedures. Con-
verting to the total payment by Medicare and beneficiaries, the estimated increase
in payments is $23.5 million for arthroscopy and $177.7 for colonoscopy procedures.
In the other counterfactual setting, we estimate savings of $75.4 million for the two
procedures together.
Similar to the assumptions for Medicare and patient payments, we assume that
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locations and the average complication rates for a surgeon are unchanged. This
assumption could be strong for long-run analysis, but it is unlikely that the vertical
integration induces changes in provider locations or provider quality in the short-run.
Based on this assumption, we calculate the average change in traveling distance and
that in complication rates. The change in distance is not significant for patients
seeking joint arthroscopy. This result is expected because traveling is really costly for
patients who need joint arthroscopy. The effect on distance is larger for colonoscopy
patients; however, the magnitude is still not significant economically.
3.6 Vertical integration and market concentration
As both our reduced form and choice model results find, vertical integration of primary
care providers impacts the market share of downstream surgical providers. When a
PCP group is vertically integrated with a hospital, more patients will be referred to
the owning hospital and, thus, the owning hospital will gain market share. However,
the extent to which this change in ”upstream” vertical market structure impacts
the ”downstream” market structure of horizontal competition between outpatient
surgical providers (e.g., ASCs and HOPDs) is unclear. At the same time, vertical
integration can lead to changes in the horizontal market structure of PCP groups
for two reasons. First, mechanically, consolidation of PCP groups into systems will
reduce the number of PCP group owners. Second, vertical integration could lead
to more investment in integrated PCP groups, making integrated PCP groups more
attractive to patients. The extent to which vertical integration leads to horizontal
consolidation among upstream providers is also not clear.
In this section, we examine the relationship between vertical integration and mar-
ket concentration. For each market, defined at the HRR-year level, we measure market
concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used measure
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for market concentration. We measure HHIs for both upstream PCP groups and
downstream outpatient surgery providers. The mean HHIs of PCP group markets
are 925.7 and 924.2 in the arthroscopy sample and colonoscopy sample, respectively.
The HHI of the arthroscopy provider market is 2025.8 and the HHI of the colonoscopy
provider market is 1831.1. According to the standard used by the DOJ and FTC,
the PCP market is not concentrated, while the arthroscopy and colonoscopy surgeon
markets are moderately concentrated.6
With these definitions, we estimate the effect of market-level vertical integration
on each HHI measure. We define market-level vertical integration as the share of
physicians working at a vertically-integrated PCP group, V Igt. We estimate
HHIgt = θ V Igt + δt + γg + εgt (3.7)
Because the HHIs are highly skewed, we use log of HHI as the dependent variables.
We estimate separate regressions for PCP group HHI (using both procedure samples)
and HHIs for arthroscopy and colonoscopy procedures. We cluster standard errors at
the HRR level.
Table 4 presents the relation between market-level vertical integration and the
HHI in PCP markets and surgeon markets. In the columns with odd numbers, the
estimates drop the year and HRR fixed effects. These estimates suggest that when
the upstream vertical integration rate is 10 percentage points higher, the HHI of the
upstream PCP market will increase around one-fifth, and that of the downstream
surgeon market will increase around one-twentieth. For the columns with even num-
bers, the estimation relies on within-market variation. The limited variation yields
limited results. For PCP markets, in both the arthroscopy and colonoscopy samples,
6The DOJ and FTC generally consider markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500
points to be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 points to
be highly concentrated.
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vertical integration still significantly affects market concentration. An increase of 10
percentage points in the integration rate is associated with a 2.1% increase in the
market HHI for PCP groups. However, for the downstream provider market, the
effect of integration is not statistically significant and is modest in magnitude.
Based on our choice model, we extend the counterfactual analysis to examining
the effect of the integration on the market concentration. Using the estimated pa-
rameters, we simulated the surgeon market in the two counterfactual scenarios set up
in the previous section—all the PCP groups are integrated, and all are independent,
and compute the HHI of each market. Figure 3·3 shows the distribution of changes
in surgeon market HHIs following the (dis-)integration. If all the PCP groups are
integrated, as presented by the red contoured bars, most of the markets will be more
concentrated for both joint arthroscopy and colonoscopy. Like the estimates from the
above regressions, the average magnitude of changes is small—7.61 (SD 13.53) and
38.56 (SD 57.44) points increase for joint arthroscopy and colonoscopy, respectively.
Moving to the other end—all the PCP groups are independent, the changes are even
smaller. On average, the arthroscopy market and the colonoscopy market will be 2.45
(SD 9.83) and 7.6 (SD 31.88) points less concentrated, respectively.
3.7 Discussion and conclusion
The market environment for U.S. physicians is rapidly changing, as a growing share
of physician practices have vertically integrated with hospitals and health systems.
Changes in physician group ownership have led to concerns about how changes in
physician financial incentives impact patient care. This concern is particularly note-
worthy in the market for outpatient surgeries for Medicare patients. Due to the large
difference in payments based on the site-of-care where a procedure is performed, ver-
tical integration can create incentives to perform procedures in Hospital Outpatient
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Departments rather than in Ambulatory Surgical Centers. This paper shows that
vertical integration of primary care physician groups leads to allocation changes in
outpatient care delivery settings. It increases the probability of referring patients to
hospital-based facilities. These allocation changes, in turn, lead to increased spend-
ing and increased travel time for patients. Importantly, we did not find any quality
improvement brought by the vertical integration for the two procedures. Future stud-
ies are needed to draw a broader conclusion for the total utilization and the overall
health outcomes. However, the lack of a measurable change in quality suggests that
efficiency gains from vertical integration may not materialize to patients.
This paper is not without limitations. For one, we restrict our analysis to the
Medicare fee-for-service population. Medicare sets prices administratively, which is
in stark contrast to the negotiated-prices system among private insurers. Other work
has shown that vertical integration leads to an increase in prices for private insurers
(Baker, Bundorf and Kessler, 2014). Thus, it is likely that the changes in procedure
prices and spending are under-estimated in the Medicare system, relative to the pri-
vate insurance system. In addition, we only examined two common outpatient proce-
dures. However, the same site-of-care payment differentials exist for other outpatient
surgeries and procedures like diagnostic imaging and laboratory tests. We also did
not distinguish between within-system referral and cross-system referral among refer-
rals to hospital-based facilities. Finally, we do not examine how increased Medicare
payments are allocated between physician groups and hospitals.
Despite these limitations, this paper’s results indicate how payment incentives can
impact the allocation of patients to providers. These results have several important
policy implications. First, the extent to which Medicare and other insurers site-of-
care differentials contribute to the incentives for health care systems to vertically
consolidate suggests that reducing the ”arbitrage” opportunities in payment models
135
could limit the impacts of vertical integration. Second, the extent to which changes in
patient allocation across providers represent allocation inefficiencies, such as requiring
patients to travel further or increases in patient cost-sharing payments, suggests that
more regulatory oversight of vertical consolidation may be warranted. While the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have provided guidelines
for monitoring vertical consolidation, the impacts of regulatory activity on vertical
consolidation of health care providers are uncertain (DoJ and FTC, 2020).
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Figure 3·1: Trend of vertical integration
(a) Number of PCPs
(b) Number of beneficiaries
Notes: The two subplots show the trend of vertical integration from 2013
to 2017. The sample is the 100% Medicare Fee-For-Service sample. For
the top figure, the integration is measured by the number of physicians
working at integrated PCP groups. For the bottom figure, the integration
is measured by the number of Medicare beneficiaries whose assigned PCP
groups are integrated.
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Notes: The eight subplots show the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the event study
regressions. The top and bottom panel correspond to arthroscopy and colonoscopy procedures,
respectively. The titles indicate the dependent variables. In all the regressions, we control for
procedure fixed effects, year fixed effects, and group fixed effects.
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Notes: The two histograms show the distribution of HHI changes following a full dis-integration
(grey solid) and a full integration (red contour) for joint arthroscopy and colonoscopy, respectively.
The unit of observation is market.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of reduced-form samples and choice
model samples
Arthroscopy Colonoscopy
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
A. PCP group sample
Integrated 0.272 0.445 0.167 0.373
Hospital-Based Share 0.577 0.478 0.492 0.471
Allowed amount ($) 1290.57 1249.93 587.29 310.6
OOP ($) 406.42 693.54 158.8 197.85
Distance (miles) 16.509 16.65 12.772 13.148
Any complication 0.002 0.966 0.075 0.998
N observations 773,374 2,659,752
B. Individual choice sample
Hospital-based facility 0.56 0.5 0.46 0.5
Avg. OOP payment 380.66 188.98 170.24 85.85
Complication rate 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.17
Distance 33.2 21.13 33.51 20.72
Age 71.75 4.95 72.96 5.55
Female 0.53 0.5 0.53 0.5
PCP group size 156.52 299.35 169.57 341.15
PCP integrated 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49
Market avg N PCP 577.51 1043.43 699.27 1220.46
Market avg N MD 2253.93 4386.26 2850.51 5234.84
Market avg income 47475.56 14585.11 48460.72 15115.83
N Obs 1,366,823 13,193,080
Notes: The top panel shows the summary statistics of the two reduced-form samples. The unit
of observation is PCP group-state-month-procedure. The bottom panel shows the summary
statistic of the 25% random sample of the choice model samples. This sample includes the full
choice set for each beneficiary.
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Table 3.2: Relation between vertical integration and group outcomes
HOPD vol. share Allowed amount OOP Distance Complication
Arthroscopy (N=773,374)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Integrated 0.0366*** 6.458 15.15* 1.623*** -0.000984
(0.0141) (15.13) (8.859) (0.390) (0.00151)
R-squared 0.360 0.360 0.347 0.353 0.122
Colonoscopy (N=2,659,752)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Integrated 0.0369* 7.140 9.454*** 1.148*** -0.000224
(0.0189) (5.736) (2.876) (0.265) (0.00159)
R-squared 0.531 0.300 0.470 0.318 0.097
Notes: The eight columns report estimates from eight different regressions. The column heads
show the dependent variables for each column. The top panel focus on arthroscopy while the
bottom panel focus on colonoscopy. All the regressions include procedure code fixed effects,
year and month fixed effects, and provider group fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by
volume. The standard errors are clustered by provider group.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.3: Nested-logit regression results for provider choice
Arthroscopy (N = 1,366,823)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Integrated 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.156***
(0.0218) (0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0333)
Market characteristics X X X
OOP X complication X
Surgeon characteristics X integrated X
AME (VI) 0.0284 0.0282 0.0281 0.0324
(0.0072) (0.00705) (0.00714) (0.00768)
Colonoscopy (N =13,193,080)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Integrated 0.310*** 0.307*** 0.308*** 0.330***
(0.0171) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0177)
Market characteristics X X X
OOP X complication X
Surgeon characteristics X integrated X
AME (VI) 0.0670 0.0659 0.0663 0.0708
(0.0016) (0.00158) (0.00202) (0.00139)
Notes: The eight columns report the estimates and the average marginal effect (AME) from
eight different regressions. The four columns in the top panel focus on arthroscopy claims and
the four in the bottom panel focus on colonoscopy claims. All the regressions control for patient
characteristics (age and gender), PCP group size, surgeon characteristics (average OOP and
complication rate), travelling distance, and year fixed effects. Column (2)-(5), and (6)-(8) also
include market characteristics (per capita income, and number of non-federal PCPs). Column
(3) and (7) allows for the interaction between OOP payment and complication rate. Column (4)
and (8) allows for the interaction between surgeon characteristics and PCP groups’ integration
status. Standard errors of estimates are clustered by year. The standard errors of AME are
calculated by the Delta method.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
142
Table 3.4: Relation between horizontal market concentration and ver-
tical integration
Arthroscopy (N = 1,530)
PCP market HHI Surgeon market HHI
(mean = 925.73) (mean = 2025.78)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PCP integration rate 2.005*** 0.212** 0.484*** -0.0496
(0.103) (0.0893) (0.0955) (0.0681)
R-squared 0.198 0.963 0.016 0.950
Year FE Yes Yes
HRR FE Yes Yes
Cluster SE HRR HRR
Colonoscopy (N = 1,530)
PCP market HHI Surgeon market HHI
(mean = 924.21) (mean = 1831.09)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
PCP integration rate 2.216*** 0.213** 0.503*** 0.0268
(0.157) (0.101) (0.139) (0.0997)
R-squared 0.116 0.977 0.008 0.967
Year FE Yes Yes
HRR FE Yes Yes
Cluster SE HRR HRR
Notes: The table shows the relation between vertical integration percentage in PCP market
and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) in the PCP market and the surgeon market. The
observations unit is Hospital Referral Regions (HRR)-year. The HHIs are calculated based on
number of claims. The dependent variables in the regressions are the log of the HHIs. The
top and bottom panel focus on arthroscopy and colonoscopy claims, respectively. Columns of
odd number show the raw correlation between the percentage of integrated physicians and the
market HHIs. In columns of even number, we control for year fixed effects and HRR fixed
effects. The standard errors are clustered by HRR.
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Table 3.5: Effects of vertical integration on patient welfare
Arthroscopy Colonoscopy
All integrated All independent All integrated All independent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N decisions (million) 3.15 7.59
∆ HOPD volume (thousand) 16.71 -8.84 341.89 -195.58
∆ OOP (million) 4.7 -1.98 35.54 -13.1
∆ Medicare total payment (million) 23.48 -9.91 177.71 -65.52
∆ Distance per patient 0.00941 -0.00129 0.15328 -0.04725
∆ Complication rate (z-score) 0.00025 0.00004 0.00819 -0.00316
Notes: The table shows the welfare analysis based on the choice model estimation
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Chapter 3 Appendices
A Construction of Vertical Integration Measures
Attribution of Physicians and Physician Groups to Hospitals and Health
Systems
To measure vertical integration, we linked physician groups to hospitals and health
systems. This process involved several data sources and steps.
1. First, we used data from the Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Spe-
cialty (MD-PPAS) data to physician-level National Provider Identifiers (NPIs)
to organization-level Tax Identification Numbers (TINs). This mapping con-
structed our preliminary physician organizations.
2. Next, we combined TINs for academic physician organizations into a single
entity.
3. We then combined TINs for non-academic physician organizations by evaluat-
ing how frequently two TINs were listed by the same physician in MD-PPAS. If
two TINs had a sufficient number of physicians in common and/or had similar
enough names in MD-PPAS, we considered the TINs to belong to the same
physician organization. After an initial round of combining TINs into physician
organizations, a second round of physician organizations were created consider-
ing the physician overlap between a TIN and the physician organizations from
the first round.
4. After mapping physicians to groups, we mapped groups to hospitals and health
systems using the Provider Enrollment and Chain Ownership System (PECOS)
data. We supplemented this data with data from IRS Form 990 reports for
non-profit hospitals.
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Attribution of Medicare Beneficiaries to Physician Groups
After linking physician groups to hospital and health systems, we linked Medicare
beneficiaries to physician groups. We developed eight attribution rules that consider
patient visits and expenditures. Out of a total Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) popu-
lation of 38.4 million, our mapping successfully matched 26,442,987 beneficiaries to
a physician group. Of the 38.4 million beneficiaries during the 2013 to 2016 time
period, 12.0 million did not have an evaluation and management visit with a primary
care provider (step 4) and were thus not mapped to a primary care provider in their
respective year.
Our mapping uses the following steps:
1. Assign beneficiaries to the physician group where the beneficiary receives the
most evaluation and management visits (CPT codes 99201- 99499) from a pri-
mary care provider. Primary care providers were defined as general internal
medicine, family medicine, and geriatrics specialties as well as nurse practition-
ers and physician assistants (88.1% of attributed beneficiaries).
1. a. In cases of ties, we only considered the three physician specialties. b. For
additional ties, we looked at all evaluation and management visits performed by any
type of provider. c. For unresolved ties, we calculated total standardized spending on
evaluation and management services to any type of provider and used the provider
with the largest spending amount for a beneficiary’s care. 2. For beneficiaries with
no evaluation and management visits from a primary care provider, we assigned the
beneficiary to the group that performed the most evaluation and management vis-
its among internal medicine subspecialists (2.2% of attributed beneficiaries). a. In
cases of ties, we used all evaluation and management visits performed by any type of
provider (0.3% of attributed beneficiaries). b. For additional ties, we used standard-
ized evaluation and management spending attributable to any type of provider (0.7%
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of attributed beneficiaries). 3. If steps 1 and 2 result in ties, we use the location of
both the annual Medicare Wellness visit and the last visit (1.2% of attributed bene-
ficiaries). 4. We did not attribute beneficiaries with no evaluation and management
services to primary care providers or internal medicine subspecialists.
B Additional Tables and Figures
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Bleeding 998.1, 719.10, 719.16, 719.17, 39.98
Post-operative deep vein thrombosis 453.40–453.42, 453.50–453.52,453
Pulmonary embolism 415.1
90 days
Mechanical failure 996.40, 996.4, 996.49
Wound infection 682.1–682.9, 686.9, 998.6, 998.7, 998.83, 998.3,998.5, 996.66, 996.67, 86.22, 86.28,
86.04, 81.53,81.55, 81.59, 00.70, 00.71, 00.72, 00.73, 00.80, 00.81, 00.82, 00.84,80.05,
80.06, 80.09
Postoperative nerve injury 955, 956, 957.8, 957.9
Panel B. ICD-10
7 days
Cardiovascular Complications I2109, I2119, I2111, I2129, I214 , I213 , I219, I21A1 , I21A9, I973, I20, I240, I248,
Pneumonia & Influenza J13, J181, J120, J121, J122, J1281, J1289, J129, J150, J151, J14, J154, J153, J1520,
J15211, J15212, J1529, J158, J155, J156, A481, J159, J157, J180, J189, J1100,
J09X1, J1008, J690,
Shock R571, R578, R6521, T8110A,
Sepsis A409, A412, A4101, A4102, A411, A403, A414, A415, A413, A4151, A4152, A4153,
A4159, A4189, A419 , R6521, R6520, R7881
30 days
Bleeding complications D7801, D7821, D7822, E3601, E3602, G9731, G9732, G9751, G9752, H59111,
H59112, H59113, H59119, H59121, H59122, H59123, H59129, H59311, H59312,
H59313, H59319, H59321, H59322, H59323, H59329 , H9521, H9522, H9541, H9542,
I97410 , I97411, I97418, I9742, I97610, I97611, I97618, I9762, J9561, J9562, J95830,
J95831, K9161, K9162, K91840, K91841, L7601, L7602, L7621, L7622, M96810,
M96811, M96830 , M96831, N9961, N9962, N99820, N99821, D7831, G9762, H59341,
H59342, H59343, H59349, H9551, H9552, I97621, L7602, L7632, M96840, M96841,
N99841, G9764, I97622, L7634, M96842, M96843, N99843, T888XXA
Hemarthrosis M2500, M25069, M25061, M25062, M25011, M25012, M25019, M25073, M25076
Control Bleeding 0W3Q3ZZ, 0W3Q4ZZ, 0W3Q7ZZ, 0W3Q8ZZ, 0X320ZZ, 0X323ZZ, 0X324ZZ,
0X330ZZ, 0X333ZZ, 0X334ZZ, 0X340ZZ, 0X343ZZ, 0X344ZZ, 0X350ZZ, 0X353ZZ,
0X354ZZ, 0X360ZZ, 0X363ZZ, 0X364ZZ, 0X370ZZ, 0X373ZZ, 0X374ZZ, 0X380ZZ,
0X383ZZ, 0X384ZZ, 0X390ZZ, 0X393ZZ, 0X394ZZ, 0Y390ZZ, 0Y393ZZ, 0Y394ZZ,
0Y3B0ZZ, 0Y3B3ZZ, 0Y3B4ZZ, 0Y3C0ZZ, 0Y3C3ZZ, 0Y3C4ZZ, 0Y3D0ZZ,
0Y3D3ZZ, 0Y3D4ZZ, 0Y3F0ZZ, 0Y3F3ZZ, 0Y3F4ZZ, 0Y3G0ZZ, 0Y3G3ZZ,
0Y3G4ZZ, 0Y3H0ZZ, 0Y3H3ZZ, 0Y3H4ZZ, 0Y3J0ZZ, 0Y3J3ZZ, 0Y3J4ZZ
Post-operative DVT/PE I742, I743, I8010, I80209, I803, I808, I809, I82220, I82290, I823, I82479, I82499,
I82609, I82629, I82890, I82A19, I82B19, I82C19, I2690, I2692, I2699, T800XXA,
T81718A, T8171XA , T8172XA, I82409, I82419, I82429, I82439, I824Y9, I82449,
I82499, I824Z9, I82509 , I82549, I8291
ABO incompatibility T8030XA, T80311A, T8039XA
Pulmonary embolism I2690 , I2699, T800XXA, T81718A, T8172XA, I2692
90 days
Mechanical Complications T84498A, T84039A, T84029A, T84019A, M979XXA, M9711XA, M9712XA,
T84033A, T84032A, T84059A, T84069A, T84099A, T84119A, T84129A, T84199A,
Cellulitis & Infection L03221 , L03319, L03119, L03129, L03317, L03811, L03818, L0390, L0391, L089,
T8183XA, T8169XA, T8189XA
Wound Disruption T8130XA, T8132XA, T8131XA, T8133XA, K6811, T8450XA, T8460XA, T847XXA
Postoperative nerve injury S4430XA, S4410XA, S4400XA, S4420XA, S4440XA, S4450XA, S6430XA, S448X9A,
S4490XA, S7400XA, S7410XA, S8400XA, S8410XA, S7420XA, S8420XA, S84809A,
S84809A, S8490XA, S149XXA , S149XXA
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congestive heart failure 428.0–428.9
cardiac or respiratory arrest 427.5, 799.1, 997.1
syncope, hypotension, or shock 453.29, 458.8–458.9, 639.5,780.2, 785.50–785.51, 998.0, 995.4
perforation 569.83, 998.2




Nausea, vomiting, dehydration 276.5, 536.2, 787.0-02
Abdominal pain 789
Diverticulitis 562.01, 562.03, 562.11, 562.13
Enterocolitis 555–556
ICD-10
Arrhythmia I471, I472, I479, I4891, I4892, I4901, I4902
Acute myocardial infarction I2109, I2119, I2111, I2129, I214, I213, I219, I21A1, I21A9, I495, R001, I498, I499
Congestive heart failure I50814, I509, I501, I5020, I5021, I5023, I5030, I5031, I5033, I5040, I5041, I5043,
I50810, I50811, I50813, I5082, I5083, I5084, I5089, I509, I110, I130, I132, I255, I420,
I425, I426, I427, I428, I429, I43x, I469, R092, I9788, I9789
Syncope, hypotension, or shock 45329, I9589, I959, R55, T882XXA, R579, R570, T8110XA, T81, T811, T8110,
T8110XA, T8110XD, T8110XS, T8111, T8111XA, T8111XD, T8140XS, T8140,
T8112XA, T8112XD, T8112XS, T8119, T8119XA, T8119XD, T8119XS
Disruption of wound, including perfo-
ration
T813, T8130, T8130XA, T8130XD, T8130XS, T8131, T8131XA, T8131XD,
T8131XS, T8132, T8132XA, T8132XD, T8132XS, T8133, T8133XA, T8133XD,
T8133XS, T814, T8140, T81 40XA, T8140XD, T8140XS, T815, T8150, T81504,
T81504A, T81504D, T81504S, T81508, T81508A, T81508D, T81508S, T81509,
T81509A, T81509D, T81509S, T8151, T81510, T81514, T81514A, T81514D,
T81514S, T81518, T81518A, T81518D, T81518S, T81519, T81519A, T81519D,
T81519S, T81524, T81524A, T81524D, T81524S, T81528, T81528A, T81528D,
T81528S, T81529, T81529A, T81529D, T81529S, T8153, T81532, T81533, T81534,
T81534, T81534D, T81534S, T81538, T81538D, T81538S, T81539, T81539A,
T81539D, T81539S, T8159, T81590, T81594, T81594A, T81594D, T81594S, T81595,
T81596, T81597, T81598, T81599, T816, T8160, T8161, T8169, T817, T8171,
T81710, T81711, T81718, T81718A, T81718D, T81718S, T81719, T8172 , T8172
A, T8172 D, T8172 S, T818, T8181, T8182, T8183, T8189, T819
Perforation K631, E3611, E3612, G9749, I9752, J9572, K9171, K9172, L7612, T888XXA,
Lower gastrointestinal bleeding K921, T50905A, T8851XA, E3601, E3602, E89810, E89811, E89820, E89821, G9732,
G9752, G9762, I9742, I97620, I97621, J9562, J95831, J95861, K9161, K9162,
K91840, K91841, L7602, L7622, L7632, N9962, N99821, N99841, E89822, E89823,
G9764, I97622, J95863, K91872, K91873, L7634, N99843, T888XXA,
Bleeding Complications R58, K625, K5521, K6381, K922, R5084, J690, J698, J158, J159, 4838, J168, J189,
R7881, I38, I39,
Ileus K560, K567 ,
Nausea, vomiting, dehydration E869, E860, E861, R1110, R112, R110,
Abdominal pain R109,
Diverticulitis K5712, K5713, K5732, K5733,
Central Nervous System Event
Hemorrhage I609, I619, I621, I6200, I629
Cerebral infarction I6330, I6340, I6350,
Occlusion and stenosis I669, I6609, I6619, I6629,
Other cerebrovascular diseases I6789
Pulmonary embolism I260, I2601, I2602, I2609, I269, I2690, I2692, I2693, I2694, I2699
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